Call of the Nation – Nakhla Adimi
Can the “party” convince its environment that the continuation of weapons is the way to regain the land? On the second anniversary of the assassination of the former Secretary-General of “Hezbollah,” Hassan Nasrallah, the real question does not seem: What has changed in “Hezbollah” after his absence? But what is left of it?
The assassination of Nasrallah on September 27, 2024, in the operation that Israel called “The New Regime,” was not only the assassination of the Secretary-General of a party, but rather constituted a watershed moment in an entire political and regional path that extended more than three decades.
Two years later, it can be said that three titles changed at the same time: the Shiite community, Lebanon, and the region.
First, the Shiite environment in Lebanon has changed.
Not necessarily in the sense of its coup against Hezbollah, nor in the sense of the end of its popular or political presence, but rather in the sense that spaces that had been closed for many years have become more open to discussion. The door to questions was opened, and with it the door to criticism and review. Questions are being raised within the Shiite environment related to the war and its consequences, the state, weapons, reconstruction, and the cost paid by the villages of the south, the Bekaa, and the suburbs. This is perhaps one of the biggest transformations left by Nasrallah’s absence.
The fear of the question has largely fallen, and a discussion has begun to emerge that was not possible with the same ease before: What is the future of the Shiites within the state? Does the priority remain the regional project or the interests of the Shiite community inside Lebanon? What is the outcome of successive wars?
These questions do not mean that the Shiite environment has left Hezbollah or that it is now in confrontation with it. But the mere fact that the space for discussion and criticism has expanded means that something profound has changed.
The second transformation is the transformation of Lebanon’s position within the region.
Lebanon, which during the years of “unity of the squares” was one of the most advanced fronts in the Iranian axis project, no longer occupies the same position. The balance of power has changed, Syria has changed, Hezbollah has been subjected to major blows, and the future of the South, weapons, the spread of the army, and the state’s restoration of its authority have become central topics in the Lebanese debate and in foreign negotiations.
Here, Lebanon returned, even under the pressure of war, to its Lebanese language: the state, institutions, and army.
Thus, the ceiling of the regional project decreased, and the ceiling of the Lebanese account rose again. The political movement has become more linked to the rules of the internal game, after Lebanon was for years part of a conflict larger than its borders.
But the third, and perhaps the most profound, transformation occurred in Iran itself.
Nasrallah built his relationship with the Islamic Republic under the Iranian leadership he had known for decades, and it goes beyond the traditional relationship between the leadership of a country and an allied organization. With the absence of Nasrallah, and then the absence of the Iranian leadership, and instead of a relationship based on a personality who possesses a large margin of weight and influence within the axis, this relationship became more involved with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on the basis of “Your command is our master,” making the new “Hezbollah” leadership more closely linked to the center of Iranian military and security decision-making.
Hence the harshest conclusion in describing this transformation: that “Hezbollah” moved from the position of a partner in making part of the Iranian regional decision-making to a position closer to the faction within the Revolutionary Guard system.
Ali Al-Taher: The site that summarizes the transformation
The most important thing remains at the field level: the south itself is no longer the same. After the 2024 war, and then the war that broke out in March 2026, Israel came to control large areas of the south exceeding 550 km², or approximately 5% of the area of Lebanon, and established a security zone within Lebanese territory. On September 3, it announced operational control over Ali al-Taher Hill, one of the most strategic sites in the region, before announcing on September 10 the destruction of the tunnel structure that Hezbollah had built at the site over many years.
It is true that the “party” remained able to launch drones, but the military question became: Can it prevent Israel from advancing, striking its structure on the front lines, and redrawing the rules of engagement from within Lebanon?
Current realities give Israel cards that did not exist in this form two years ago. Perhaps there is no place that summarizes the transformation on the ground more than Ali Al-Taher. The scene of transformation was completed by placing weapons on the negotiating table after the “party” was imposing internal and regional equations through it.
Before 2024, Hezbollah’s weapons were taken for granted. Today, the weapon itself has become a central topic in the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations under American auspices, within the framework agreement, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, despite all the antics he is making, has not been able to change course, so much so that his description of the framework agreement as a “surrender” to Israel has become mere talk with no effect.
Even shaking a finger no longer works or scares anyone. The situation that the “party” reached was strongly demonstrated during the government accountability sessions, and the attempts of the representatives of the “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc to disturb the atmosphere through successive interventions, comments, and responses to create confusion. They were the star of the heated debates, and clearly showed a loss of their nerve before they rushed out of the hall during the vote of confidence in the government.
September 27… What will Qasim say?
Most likely, Qassem will not enter Nasrallah’s memory to tell his fans that “the party” lost. Rather, he will build a speech on a different idea: “They could not bring us down.” He will need to turn survival into an achievement, and why not into a new divine victory. He will confirm that Israel, despite all its strikes, did not succeed in disarming Hezbollah.
But the question is: If weapons are what protect the south, how did Israel become inside the south?
If the resistance is what prevents the occupation, then why is the Lebanese state required to negotiate to restore the land?
Can Hezbollah convince its environment that the continuation of weapons is the way to regain the land, after the restoration of the land itself has become linked to the role of the Lebanese army and international negotiations?
Thus, it can be said that two years were enough to change the equation:
On September 27, 2024, the question was: Who will succeed Nasrallah?
On September 27, 2025, the question was: Can Hezbollah survive?
As for September 27, 2026, the question is bigger: What is left of Hezbollah?
