American envoy Tom Barrack launched a position that would mix the cards on the Lebanese-Israeli track, after he considered that reaching a serious settlement in Lebanon required the involvement of Iran and Hezbollah, in an approach that not only contradicts the negotiating path that President Joseph Aoun is trying to establish, but also pushes Lebanon back to the policy of axes from which it seeks to exit.
Barak’s words came during an extensive interview with activist and media figure Mario Nofal, in which he discussed the complexities of the Lebanese file and its intertwining with the regional confrontation between Iran and Israel.
According to Barak, gathering the various Lebanese forces around one table will not be enough to reach a solution if Iran and Hezbollah remain outside the equation, wondering: “How will the matter disappear if Hezbollah and Iran are not involved?”
This speech does not merely represent a description of Iranian influence or the size of “Hezbollah” inside Lebanon, but rather opens the door to redefining the nature of the negotiations themselves, so that they are no longer confined between the Lebanese state and Israel, but rather turn into a broader regional path in which Tehran and the party become part of the settlement.
And here lies the problem with Barak’s approach. Lebanon is trying, after many years during which it was an open arena for the conflicts of others, to rebuild its position as an independent, sovereign state that makes its decisions through its institutions and negotiates in the name of its national interests, not as an extension of a regional axis or a card in the hands of any external party. But the American envoy, instead of supporting this path, in his words reintroduces Lebanon into the heart of the axes’ game, as if the future of the Lebanese state cannot be decided from Beirut except with Tehran’s presence at the table.
This proposal practically contradicts the approach adopted by President Joseph Aoun, which is based on establishing the state as the only body authorized to negotiate on behalf of Lebanon, in parallel with dealing with the “Hezbollah” weapons file within the Lebanese framework and under the title of restricting weapons and the decision of war and peace in the hands of legitimate institutions.
In Aoun’s approach, the state negotiates with Israel on files related to withdrawal, cessation of attacks, security arrangements, and Lebanese sovereignty, while the “Hezbollah” file remains a Lebanese matter that the state addresses with the Lebanese.
As for Barak, he mixes the two paths again. When he practically requires the presence of Iran and Hezbollah to reach a settlement, he not only gives them a role in the solution, but also re-recognizes that Lebanon is part of the Iranian-Israeli confrontation, and that its sovereign issues cannot be separated from bargaining between regional powers.
Here the paradox becomes clearer: Washington is demanding that Lebanon build a strong state, confine weapons to its institutions, and restore its sovereign decision-making, while one of its most prominent envoys comes to practically say that this state cannot produce a settlement without Iran and Hezbollah. If the state is sovereign and decision-making, why should Tehran sit at a table that is supposed to discuss Lebanese territory, Lebanese security, and the future of the Lebanese borders?
The danger of Barak’s words lies in the fact that he gives opponents of the idea of an independent state an additional excuse to say that Lebanon cannot depart from the axes, and reconnects its political and security future with the confrontation between Iran and Israel at the moment when its institutions are trying to separate the Lebanese interest from that confrontation.
Thus, the questions raised become bigger than the future of the Lebanese-Israeli negotiations themselves: Does Washington really want to help Lebanon regain its independent decision-making? Or does it see it again as an arena that can be included within a larger regional deal with Iran?
Barak’s message during his interview with Mario Novel seemed clear: Lebanese forces alone are not enough to produce a settlement, and Iran and Hezbollah cannot be bypassed.
But this approach puts Lebanon in front of the equation that it is specifically trying to get rid of. While Joseph Aoun seeks to return the decision to Beirut and the Lebanese state, Barak re-expands the table to accommodate Tehran and Hezbollah, and returns Lebanon from the logic of a sovereign state to the logic of an arena in which regional powers share their fate.
