October 27, 2026
The head of the Yashar Party, Gadi Eisenkot, is waging a fierce electoral battle to remove Benjamin Netanyahu from the political scene and form the next Israeli government, based on the street’s anger over the failures of October 7 and the failure of Haredi recruitment. On a tense election day that began from the Gaza Strip and passed by the grave of his son who was killed in the Strip, Eisenkot faced early political obstacles that were evident in accusations of sabotaging his ballot papers, in addition to coalition complications that forced him to engage in arduous negotiations with figures such as Avigdor Lieberman and the Arab parties to ensure a ruling majority. However, a careful reading of the Jerusalem Post reveals a glaring political paradox. The potential prime minister does not have in his strategic arsenal, specifically regarding the thorny Lebanese issue, a vision that differs fundamentally from the doctrine of his arch-rival Netanyahu.
In the Lebanese arena, the general and the politician agree on the necessity of maintaining a buffer “security zone,” showing a conditional readiness for partial withdrawals in exchange for Lebanese army control and the evacuation of the region from “Hezbollah” forces, amid deep skepticism on both sides of the ability of the Lebanese military establishment to accomplish this mission. Although Eisenkot was open to accelerating the pace of withdrawal under American pressure, he drew a strict red line eight kilometers deep to paralyze the party’s ability to launch anti-armor missiles deep into Israel. The only tactical difference in this file lies in Eisenkot’s effort to reintegrate the French role into the diplomatic solution, unlike Netanyahu, who used the differences with Paris in public political demonstrations. The scene is not much different on the Syrian front, where Eisenkot adheres to the security zone and refuses to give any confidence to Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa, recalling his past linked to Al-Qaeda.
As for approaching the Iranian file and the Gaza war, Eisenkot’s policy oscillates between realism and the American shadow. He refuses to conclude any bad agreement led by the Trump administration with Tehran, but he prefers quiet opposition away from public conflict, leaving Netanyahu to take the greatest military risk and determine the “point of no return” early. In the besieged Gaza Strip, Eisenkot’s vision appears to be more submissive to the “Trump plan,” expressing his readiness to end Hamas’ control within 18 months by empowering technocratic leaders and police affiliated with the Palestinian Authority and deploying international forces, while accepting reconstruction conditional on disarmament. However, he stands firmly, just like Netanyahu, against any proposal that paves the way for the establishment of a Palestinian state during his term.
The real differences between the two men explode in the West Bank and foreign policy arena. Eisenkot intends to cause a security earthquake by dismissing Shin Bet head David Zinni, reactivating the administrative detention of Jewish extremists, and removing more than a hundred random settlement outposts while freezing new settlement construction. On the diplomatic level, the general aspires to restore dilapidated bridges with Europe, the American Democratic Party, and Middle Eastern countries that are repulsed by Netanyahu’s policies. However, this diplomatic push lacks an integrated strategic plan, which leaves the deep gap between American expectations and Israeli reality intact, even if Netanyahu is no longer in power.
