Translation of “Lebanon Debate”
Two American researchers warned that the political, economic and security incentives offered by President Donald Trump’s administration to Lebanon take precedence over Beirut’s implementation of its commitments related to disarming Hezbollah, considering that Washington risks losing its basic pressure card before achieving tangible and verifiable results.
In an analysis published by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, researchers Ahmed Sharawi and David Daoud wrote that President Joseph Aoun and his allies were right to present his visit to Washington last month as a success.
According to the writers, Trump returned President Aoun to Beirut loaded with political, economic and security incentives, in an attempt to attract Lebanon towards Washington before Tehran could exploit the ceasefire path between the United States and Iran to preserve Hezbollah.
The analysis found that the American strategy is “sound,” but its implementation is not, because the rewards offered by Washington take precedence over Beirut’s implementation of the framework agreement signed on June 26.
The writers explained that the agreement links the provision of new American aid and the implementation of a gradual Israeli withdrawal to the Lebanese state taking documented, nationwide steps against Hezbollah.
They considered that providing incentives before implementing these conditions threatens to deprive Washington of the pressure tools it needs to ensure the desired results are achieved, and that American rewards must come after disarming the party, not before.
The analysis attributed the state of urgency in Washington and Tehran to the setbacks Hezbollah suffered in the field.
The writers claimed that since the party’s attack on Israel in October 2023, Israel has killed a large portion of its senior leadership and hundreds of middle-level leaders, and has also destroyed a large portion of its arsenal and infrastructure.
They added that the almost daily Israeli strikes, which continued after the ceasefire in November 2024, hindered Hezbollah’s attempts to restore its capabilities.
According to the analysis, Hezbollah attacked northern Israel days after the outbreak of war with Iran on February 28, which led to Israel launching a new attack that the two writers described as more ferocious.
The two researchers believed that Iran needed to end that war and stop the open Israeli campaign of attrition, and therefore in April it took advantage of Washington’s efforts to reach a ceasefire with Tehran, with the aim of extracting a parallel truce in Lebanon.
According to the article, Iran succeeded in returning the decision regarding Hezbollah’s arsenal exclusively to Lebanese hands, in accordance with what the party was demanding, which moved the file to an internal arena more appropriate for rebuilding its capabilities.
The writers pointed out that the broad support enjoyed by Hezbollah within the Shiite environment kept the Lebanese political and military leaders fearful that disarming it by force would lead to igniting a civil conflict.
Based on this, they considered that the internal track could be delayed, emptied of its content, or reduced to formal procedures, which would give Hezbollah space to rebuild its strength.
The analysis concluded that the success of Trump’s strategy in Lebanon does not depend on the size of the incentives offered to Beirut, but rather on their chronological order, such that the American rewards come after documented Lebanese steps against Hezbollah’s weapons, not before them.
