Translation of “Lebanon Debate”
Hezbollah may be in the process of adopting a “hierarchy of concessions” in southern Lebanon, allowing it to hand over some sites and facilities to the Lebanese army, while maintaining the necessary infrastructure to maintain it as a military force capable of withstanding and rebuilding its capabilities, according to a reading published by the Israeli “Alma” Center.
Researcher Dana Pollack wrote that reports appeared in Lebanon this week that talked about Hezbollah dividing its infrastructure in the south into 3 levels of importance, based on its operational value and the extent of its ability to replace it if it was forced to abandon it.
According to the analysis, this division may reveal a possible course of action through which Hezbollah seeks to confront the implementation of the agreement between Lebanon and Israel, by handing over specific assets to the Lebanese army, in exchange for preserving the basic facilities that ensure its continued military power in the south.
Pollack believes, based on the ALMA Center’s understanding of the relationship between Hezbollah and the Lebanese Army, that any handover of this kind will only occur by a decision from the party, and not as a result of an initiative or demand issued by the army.
The lower level includes facilities that Hezbollah can abandon at a relatively limited operational cost, including small sites, limited weapons depots, observation points, and facilities that were discovered during the war and have lost their importance.
According to the reading, handing over these sites to the Lebanese army may allow the party to give the impression of its unwillingness to confront the military institution, which is an institution that enjoys Lebanese consensus, without causing significant damage to its basic capabilities.
The analysis suggests that these sites contain only limited and basic weapons, and that these weapons will return to Hezbollah later through an arrangement based on what he described as a “revolving door.”
The second level includes ammunition depots, maintenance and supply facilities, assembly points, launching sites, and short underground infrastructure. Hezbollah may be prepared to abandon some of these facilities after emptying them of their contents.
According to the analysis, transferring a site to the Lebanese Army does not necessarily mean dismantling the military capacity it contained, as equipment can be transferred while maintaining the possibility of re-operating the site or creating an alternative to it in the future. It is also possible, through the “revolving door” method, that the site may later be returned to Hezbollah.
The “ALMA” Center indicated that behavior similar to what was mentioned in the first and second levels was recorded during the year 2025, but in a very limited number of documented cases in which the Lebanese army reached sites belonging to Hezbollah, it was said that they were handed over to it.
The upper level, according to the analysis, determines the ceiling of concessions that Hezbollah may be prepared to make. It includes operational centers of gravity, such as command and control centers, strategic tunnels, warehouses containing high-quality weapons, and high-altitude positions that allow monitoring and management of military activity.
Pollack believes that these facilities give Hezbollah the ability to maintain command, control, steadfastness, qualitative weapons, and control of the region, and constitute “the structure on which a military force can be built again when needed.”
Accordingly, Hezbollah may use this hierarchy to selectively manage its assets, by handing over damaged, exposed, or easily replaced facilities, disarming medium-critical sites before handing them over, and insisting on retaining the most vital facilities.
In this way, the party may allow the Lebanese army to expand its reach and demonstrate field achievements, without this necessarily meaning that it abandons the infrastructure that enables it to maintain and rebuild its military strength in southern Lebanon.
The analysis concluded that the number of sites handed over to the Lebanese Army constitutes only a partial criterion for measuring the implementation of the agreement. The most important questions relate to the quality of the facilities handed over, what was removed from them before the handover, and the assets that Hezbollah refuses to give up.
If the circulating division indeed reflects Hezbollah’s approach, then the positions it clings to, not those it hands over, may reveal the essence of the military power it seeks to maintain in southern Lebanon.
