October 27, 2026
Has Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri begun to reconsider his relationship with Hezbollah? Has the alliance, which for decades formed a fundamental pillar of the Shiite political scene, transformed from a source of strength into a political and security burden on the Amal Movement? Two questions were placed by an Israeli study at the heart of its reading of the recent developments in Lebanon, amid talk of a change in Berri’s positions and a rapprochement with former Progressive Socialist Party head Walid Jumblatt, which may open the door to a new political alliance.
In a report published by the Israeli “Alma” Research Center, under the title “From gain to burden? Berri’s dilemma regarding Hezbollah,” researcher Dr. Zoe Levornick discussed the future of the relationship between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah, based on the hypothesis that the common interests on which the “Shiite duo” was based may be facing a very sensitive political and security test.
The study believes that the alliance between the two parties is based on a common sectarian identity and intersecting political interests, but it points out that these interests are not fixed, especially when the choices of one of the parties, i.e. Hezbollah, begin to harm the interests of the other party, i.e. the Amal Movement.
Hence, the researcher poses a basic question: Have Berri and the leadership of the Amal Movement begun to realize that Hezbollah no longer constitutes a political asset that can be benefited from, but rather has become a burden that may threaten the interests of the movement and its popular base?
The study is based on a set of positions and statements that were recently attributed to Berri, most notably his assertion that “the army is a red line,” and that the Amal Movement will stand by the Lebanese army even if it is forced to carry out sensitive missions in southern Lebanon.
It also stops at words attributed to Berri stating that relations between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah were closer during the leadership period of former Secretary-General of the party Hassan Nasrallah, indicating the possibility of a change in the nature of coordination between the two parties after that stage.
The study refers to messages said to have been conveyed in Berri’s name, to the effect that the previous format of coordination between Amal and Hezbollah had practically ended, and that the movement was no longer prepared to accept a reality in which the party made its decisions alone, and then expected its political ally to support it and bear the consequences of its choices.
However, what is striking is that the Israeli Center does not go so far as to assert that there is an actual rift between the two allies, as it acknowledges that there are so far no significant indicators of the disintegration of the “Shiite duo” or the emergence of a political rift between the Amal Movement and Hezbollah.
Rather, it indicates that Berri is still playing the role of mediator, and is seeking to prevent a direct confrontation between the party and Lebanese state institutions, which means that the talk is, at the current stage, more about the possibility of redrawing the boundaries of the relationship than about an imminent political separation.
The study places the Amal Movement and its president in front of a dilemma that it describes as major: either maintaining the alliance with Hezbollah, even if the price of that is being drawn into a new war, or expanding the political distance with the party with the aim of protecting the interests of the Shiite base that supports the movement and searching for an alternative alliance with political weight.
In this context, the researcher stops at reports that appeared on October 25, which spoke of a convergence in the positions of Berri and Jumblatt regarding the exclusivity of weapons in the hands of the state and the necessity of preventing Hezbollah from dragging Lebanon into a new military confrontation.
The study considers that this rapprochement opens the door to a political question that goes beyond the traditional relationship between Amal and Hezbollah, to pose a striking question: Could Lebanon witness the birth of a new “duo” that brings together Berri and Jumblatt?
Thus, the Israeli reading reveals an interest in the future of Lebanese alliances, specifically in a land location between Hezbollah and state institutions, without providing conclusive evidence of a radical shift in its position or the collapse of the existing alliance.
The conclusion reached by the study is not that the “Shiite duo” has ended, but rather that the continuation of the alliance, according to its assessment, puts Berri facing an increasingly difficult question: To what extent can he maintain his partnership with Hezbollah if its political and security costs become greater than its gains?
