November 18, 2026

Deposit recovery for the reconstruction of the south?

Call of the homeland

The current discussions about addressing the deposit crisis are moving towards opening a very dangerous file, related to how to benefit from the gold reserves of the Bank of Lebanon. The danger here lies in the attempt by some in the government to introduce this wealth into a political bazaar, by linking the amendment to Law 42, which has prohibited the disposal of gold since 1986, with allocating part of its value to finance the reconstruction of the south and its infrastructure. It is a quid pro quo that can only be viewed as a form of political blackmail, especially when the rights of depositors become hostage to conditions imposed by political forces, most notably Hezbollah, under the title of reconstruction.

Information circulating about the ongoing discussions indicates that there is a tendency among some parties to adopt a clear equation: If what is required is to approve a legislative amendment that allows the Bank of Lebanon to use part of its gold assets to transform them into income-generating financial assets, and subsequently contribute to securing the liquidity necessary to repay deposits, then approval of this amendment must be accompanied by allocating another part of the value of the gold to finance the reconstruction of the south. Indeed, some of those following these discussions report that they heard Hezbollah representatives proposing a more specific condition, based on allocating $15 billion of the value of gold for the reconstruction of the south, in exchange for agreeing to issue the law that allows the use of gold to address the deposit crisis.

These data mean that we are facing a dangerous precedent in the management of public money and national wealth, as a strategic asset owned by the State Central Bank is being treated as if it were property that can be politically distributed, or a fund from which shares can be deducted to meet the demands of influential powers, while the rights of hundreds of thousands of depositors are still suspended for more than seven years.

The most dangerous thing about this approach is that it attempts to make the reconstruction of the South seem like a special political right that can be imposed through legislative bargaining. The people of the South have the right to demand reconstruction, but no political party has the right to turn this entitlement into a pressure card to obtain a share of the Lebanese wealth, nor to force the rest of the Lebanese to finance the state’s obligations by deducting assets that are supposed to fall within the framework of dealing with the financial collapse.

In this context, it must be recalled that the Bank of Lebanon clarified its position regarding its gold reserves, stressing that the applicable legislative framework, especially the law issued in 1986, imposes explicit restrictions on the use or disposal of gold. Therefore, these reserves cannot be considered an available financial resource that can be liquidated or automatically included within the current restructuring plan.

But the Bank of Lebanon does not rule out, in principle, imagining a future scenario, conditional on obtaining the necessary legislative license, that would allow a portion of gold assets to be converted into income-generating financial assets, such as long-term US Treasury bonds. In this case, the revenues that could result from this arrangement must be allocated exclusively to cover the Bank of Lebanon’s share of its obligations towards depositors, not to pay the state’s debts or finance its projects, nor to cover the obligations of commercial banks.

And here lies the danger of the current political proposition. The proposal does not stop at calling for an amendment to the 1986 law, but rather goes beyond that to attempt to impose a specific use for part of the proceeds, which essentially defeats the goal that can justify any legislative amendment, which is to contribute to restoring the rights of depositors. How can the Lebanese be convinced that the goal of opening the gold file is to find an additional resource to process deposits, if the first political condition put forward in return is to deduct $15 billion from the value of this wealth to finance reconstruction?

No less dangerous is that this proposal comes at a time when an initial framework is being traded to pay up to $100,000 to each depositor, based on his total deposits with all banks, and not for each account separately. According to the proposed scenario, this ceiling is supposed to include about 90% of depositors, and that their dues will be returned within four years, with the payments they previously received under Circulars 158 and 166, which are estimated at about two billion dollars, being deducted to prevent double counting. The remaining obligations within this ceiling are supposed to be paid over a period of five to six years, through regular monthly installments.

These numbers reflect the amount of financial effort required to secure the liquidity necessary to return deposits, and confirm that every resource that can contribute to this process must be subject to one standard: protecting the rights of depositors. It is not logical to talk about providing liquidity to depositors, and then at the same time raise demands to deduct billions of dollars from gold wealth to finance other goals.

Then the question that the proponents of this proposal must answer is: Why should gold reserves bear the cost of rebuilding the south? Is it permissible for reconstruction to turn into an excuse to relieve the state of its responsibilities, or into a means to impose the priorities of a political team at the expense of the rights of depositors?

The state that spends public funds on reconstruction and infrastructure projects is required to have transparency, oversight and accountability, especially in a country that has accumulated bitter experiences with waste and corruption in public contracts and deals. Allocating billions of dollars to projects that are not subject to a clear plan and strict oversight mechanisms opens the door to additional risks, especially if these funds are treated as a political share and not national resources that must be spent according to general priorities and standards.

In conclusion, gold should not become a hostage to a trade-off between the rights of depositors and the demands of political forces. Whoever wants to amend the 1986 law must explain to the Lebanese that the goal is to protect this wealth and invest it, within strict legislative and institutional controls, to generate revenues that contribute to fulfilling the obligations of the Bank of Lebanon towards depositors. As for linking this amendment to allocating $15 billion for reconstruction, it is practically turning the deposit crisis into an opportunity to impose political conditions on the state, and putting depositors before an unjust equation: either accepting the barter, or continuing to deprive them of their rights.

Reconstructing the South is a national duty, when the war ends and the state implements its decision to monopolize weapons. But gold, which represents one of the most important remaining national wealth, should not be turned into political spoils distributed according to the balance of power. The rights of depositors are not a negotiating card, and gold is not the property of a party or sect to be divided and distributed among political and sectarian protectorates as if it were the spoils of war.