October 24, 2026
D. Raed Ghanem – Druze Today
In a controversial statement, Tom Barrack, the US ambassador to Türkiye and special presidential envoy to Syria and Iraq, linked Suwayda’s ability to finance itself with the Captagon trade, and described it as a center for this trade. This is an accusation that goes beyond political assessment, because it attributes to an entire community a central role in the cross-border drug trade, and Barak did not provide anything that can be verified in his statement.
This objection does not deny the existence of smuggling networks in southern Syria, nor does it claim that As-Suwayda is completely immune from crime. Accountability falls on specific individuals and groups, not on entire societies. Rather, the objection relates to determining responsibility, and the difference between proving criminal activity in an area and presenting it as a center for the drug industry and trade.
On September 1, 2026, American investigative journalist Jeremy Hodge published an investigation through New America entitled “The Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, and Bedouin Gun Runners.” It deals with the smuggling system between Syria and Jordan, and documents the role of networks of Bedouin clans extending on both sides of the border, united by kinship and interests, and operating within broader networks linked to the agencies of the former Syrian regime, Hezbollah, and Iran’s regional interests.
The investigation indicates that networks of Bedouin tribesmen, on both sides of the Syrian-Jordanian border, were involved in smuggling. Among them are members of the Sunni Bedouins residing in the Suwayda Governorate itself, who are active in cross-border smuggling, and are related to clans in the Jordanian Mafraq Governorate, and they ended up aligning themselves with Iran. The responsibility here falls on specific individuals and groups, not on all Bedouins, and this is the same standard that should be applied to the Druze people of Suwayda. Moreover, these operations were not isolated from the security and military transformations in the region, nor from regional conflicts and Iran’s attempts to use smuggling networks for goals beyond direct criminal profit.
It is true that this picture does not exonerate everyone who may be involved in smuggling inside Suwayda, but it makes it inaccurate to limit the phenomenon to the governorate, and requires a distinction between smuggling networks, transit routes, manufacturing sites, and the entities that manage, finance, and benefit from them.
If Barak has information proving that As-Suwayda is a global center for manufacturing and trading Captagon, then he must explain what he is basing it on. As for moving from the presence of smuggling activity in a certain area to asserting that it is a center for this industry, and then linking that to its ability to finance itself, this is a dangerous conclusion that requires independent and specific evidence, and words issued by an American official who has been making problematic statements and positions are not sufficient.
Barak’s statement cannot be separated from his positions on Suwayda since the massacres it witnessed in July 2025. He took a supportive position for the authority led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, even when government forces and armed groups allied with them were accused of serious violations that required investigation and accountability. He also questioned some accounts that hold government forces responsible for these violations, instead of making identifying those responsible and revealing what happened a clear priority in his public discourse.
This context reveals a deeper problem in his method of work: he acts in the Syrian file as if supporting the existing authority precedes holding it accountable for its actions, and as if accusing Suwayda obviates the need for a thorough investigation into the smuggling networks and their sources of funding. This raises a fundamental question about the role he plays. The diplomatic envoy is not a judge, and does not have the right to determine criminal responsibility for crimes through media statements. Then, his mission is not limited to promoting a political settlement or defending the choices of his country and its allies, but rather requires that he deal with the facts with precision and caution befitting the seriousness of the issues he addresses.
When an official on this site issues a comprehensive accusation against an entire community, in such circumstances, and without evidence to support it, it becomes legitimate to be asked, politically and professionally, about the basis of his accusation, and about the effect of his words in creating a security and political image that may be used to justify positions and policies towards this province.
Another issue arises here, which is the relationship of the diplomatic role to regional interests. Barak is an ambassador to Türkiye, and participates in drawing up American policy towards Syria, and therefore his positions must be subject to criticism, especially when they intersect with Ankara’s political and security priorities. On October 9, 2026, Reuters published an investigation in which it quoted three sources as saying that he had pushed for the involvement of a company managed by his business partner in a project to transport Iraqi oil through Syria, and that he had not submitted to the US Office of Government Ethics a request for an exemption from the conflict of interest rules. These facts, and the subsequent international media coverage, indicate a potential conflict of interest, and give any objective observer the right to question Barak’s integrity and impartiality in his capacity as a mediator in the Syrian file.
What justifies this scrutiny is not just a political disagreement with Barak, but rather the position he holds, and the impact his words could have on a country that is still suffering from the effects of violence and division, and where minorities fear for their security, their rights, and their right to political participation.
This is why I believe that Barak, in his dealings with Suwayda, exceeded the limits of the responsible diplomatic role: once when he took a biased political position in the midst of the massacres and violations it witnessed, and once when he made a comprehensive accusation regarding the Captagon without providing public evidence to justify it.
If Barak wants to convince the Syrians that his policy is based on stability and combating crime, he must start with one standard that he applies to everyone: to investigate violations, whoever committed them, to determine responsibility for smuggling with evidence, and not to turn political assessments into general accusations. He is not required to adopt Suwayda’s political position, nor to agree with its people’s choices. Rather, he is required, as he represents the United States and intervenes directly in shaping the features of the Syrian settlement, to be accurate in his accusations and consistent in his dealings with violations. Until he does so, it will remain legitimate to ask whether he is a mediator who is supposed to help resolve the conflict, or whether he is using his position to push a specific policy, even when the facts on the ground are different from what his statements suggest.
