The talk about Damascus’s willingness to send fighters to Yemen went unnoticed in Lebanon, despite the fact that weeks had passed, and despite the fact that its content extends far beyond the Yemeni arena, and perhaps even to the Lebanese geography itself. It is true that a Syrian denial was issued following the circulation of this information, but the denial was not enough to drop the hypothesis from its foundations, especially with the emergence of other data that speaks of conditions set by Damascus to proceed with a step of this kind. According to these data, the denial aimed to contain media circulation more than it targeted the origin of the idea, which the Syrians require to have a clear legal and political cover.
From here, a question arises that the relevant Lebanese circles do not seem to have overlooked: If Damascus is prepared to send fighters to Yemen, which is far from its borders and direct vital space, what prevents it from sending fighters, or facilitating the transfer of armed groups, to neighboring Lebanon?
The question does not remain within the framework of a theoretical assumption. He occupied Lebanese security and political levels, which prompted inquiries about the reality of the Syrian preparations and their limits. Inquiries, in part, reached Damascus itself, whose response was negative. But this did not completely dispel Lebanese concerns, especially since the Yemeni experience, if turned into reality, may establish a new model of Syrian military intervention outside the borders.
Yemen is the gateway to the Syrian military role
According to what was understood in Lebanese monitoring circles, Damascus showed an initial willingness to participate in military operations against the Ansar Allah Houthi group in Yemen, but it did not connect its readiness with final commitments or clear guarantees, but rather tried to turn it into a negotiating card to obtain political and strategic gains in return.
What was proposed was not necessarily sending units from the emerging Syrian army, which is still in the process of rebuilding, but rather using fighters from formations that revolve around the new authority or have influence over it, allowing Damascus to participate without bearing the direct burdens of official military intervention.
In this context, there was information about Syrian delegations visiting Riyadh to discuss the idea, its details, and implementation mechanisms. This came after a controversial visit by the Syrian interim president, Ahmed Al-Sharaa. According to this information, the Syrian objection was not to the principle of participation, but rather to its political and legal conditions. Damascus requested that any step of this kind come in response to an official request from one country to another, and within the umbrella of an Arab coalition that gives it the required legitimacy.
Hence, talk emerged about an official Syrian request to include Damascus in regional defense arrangements, including what is known as the Mecca Defense Agreement, which provides the necessary political and military framework for possible Syrian participation.
Although the file has been out of media circulation for some time due to what appears to be a Syrian-Saudi understanding, the circulating data indicates that it has not actually been closed. Damascus is still dealing with it as an opportunity to gain gains, while Riyadh does not seem in a hurry to turn it into an executive step.
In parallel, there was information that Damascus had sent several dozen military advisors to Aden, who had experience in dealing with drones, including Shaheen drones, to assist the forces affiliated with the Yemeni government. If this information is correct, the step may constitute an initial test of military cooperation, prior to moving to more advanced levels.
Specifically here, Lebanese concern becomes legitimate.
Damascus is calculating the confrontation with Iran
These possibilities gain additional importance in light of the warlike climate prevailing over the region, and the change that has occurred in Syria’s position in regional alignments.
With the recent positions attributed to Iranian Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, regarding responding to threats without geographical restrictions. He warned of the expansion of the war if the American attacks on Iran were repeated, and going to the maximum level. The possibility of expanding the geographical scope of the Iranian military response in the event that Tehran was exposed to a new aggression emerged. Damascus has begun to deal with itself as one of the countries that may become vulnerable to targeting, even without having officially announced its involvement in any confrontation.
This concern is not separate from a previous stage, when Syrian lands were excluded from the scope of the Iranian response, due to considerations related to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Turkish role in Syria. At that time, the Iranian approach was different, and Damascus was still emerging from the stage of the fall of the Assad regime, and not qualified to engage in a new regional adventure.
Circulating data indicate that Tehran had at that time issued warnings to Damascus against engaging in any military project against it, or providing security and military services to countries that might participate in attacking it. According to these data, Turkish guarantees contributed to keeping Damascus out of the confrontation. Today, messages in the same context may have reached Damascus.
In practice, Damascus is seeking to consolidate its position within regional political, security and military arrangements, some of which are viewed as anti-Iran. At the same time, Syrian circles do not stop hinting at negative Iranian roles within Syrian territories in the context of the Syrian rule’s view of Iran, in exchange for clear Iranian apathy towards any effort to rebuild the relationship with the new authority.
Iranian officials are quoted as saying that Tehran is not opposed in principle to establishing relations with Damascus, but it no longer believes that it must take the initiative to seek rapprochement. When Syria’s leaders realize their interest in this relationship, Tehran’s doors will be open to them.
Hezbollah is in the circle of Syrian accusations
In parallel with these transformations, Syrian accusations against Hezbollah of interference in Syrian internal affairs returned to the forefront, coinciding with the escalation of talk about the possibility of expanding the regional war.
During the past few hours, the Syrian authorities announced the arrest of a cell whose members they said were linked to Hezbollah, and accused them of planning to target the Homs refinery. The announcement came as part of a series of previous accusations that talked about dismantling groups active in smuggling and transporting weapons, preparing missiles, and planning security attacks. According to circulating information, the number of groups that Damascus accused of being linked to the party reached six.
On the other hand, Hezbollah denies the Syrian accusations against it, and refuses to link it to these activities.
It is noteworthy that the recent Syrian announcement coincided with accusations issued by the Saudi-backed Yemeni authorities, which spoke of the presence of Iranian and Hezbollah military advisors working for the benefit of the Ansar Allah group and contributing to the development of its military capabilities, and also with the rising temperature in the region and the increasing pressure on the party.
Thus, Hezbollah finds itself facing an escalating path of accusations, intersecting in the Syrian, Yemeni, and Lebanese arenas, in addition to the continuing Israeli accusations regarding rebuilding its military capabilities and armaments.
It is not unlikely, according to a Lebanese political reading, that this accumulation will turn into an additional pressure tool on the Lebanese state, pushing it towards taking more stringent measures against the party, based on its portrayal as a source of threat that is not limited to the Lebanese interior, but extends to the security of other countries in the region.
What is more, the multiplicity of parties that accuse the party of interfering in its affairs may be coordinated, and contribute to providing political and security justifications for any future military confrontation with it, or to provide support and participation in a war targeting it or Iran.
From this angle, the repeated Syrian announcements about dismantling groups linked to Hezbollah gain a significance that goes beyond their direct security content. When these announcements turn into an almost periodic pattern, and are accompanied by accusations affecting Syrian national security, it becomes legitimate to ask whether Damascus is working, in parallel with its security measures, to build a political file that can be used later to justify broader steps under the title of removing the danger.
This does not mean that the decision to intervene has been made, but it opens a discussion about the circumstances that could make such intervention an option.
Lebanon…the same Yemeni model?
Some time ago, there were estimates in concerned circles that any potential Syrian intervention against Hezbollah, whether as a result of American demands or in exchange for gains that Damascus considers sufficient, would not necessarily take the form of a direct military operation carried out by the Syrian army.
This option faces several obstacles, most notably Turkish reservations and the limits of Syrian military capabilities, in addition to the risks resulting from opening a direct confrontation with Lebanon.
Therefore, another vision emerged based on the use of armed formations affiliated with the new authority or operating in its vicinity, without being a direct part of the regular military establishment.
It is, in essence, the same model that was circulated within the framework of potential military cooperation with Yemen: auxiliary organizations that perform specific military roles, allowing the Syrian authority to maintain a margin of political maneuvering.
In the Lebanese case, the common border becomes the most sensitive element in this perception.
According to these estimates, the Syrian allegations about the lack of complete control over the borders, and the continued activity of smuggling networks and armed groups, may constitute an entry point to justify military or security movements under the title of controlling the borders and combating smuggling.
In this context, during the past month, movements of the Syrian army were recorded near the Lebanese border, coinciding with the activity of armed groups in the vicinity of some border crossings and areas.
But these movements did not pass without counter-messages.
It coincided with movements by the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces on the Syrian-Iraqi border, followed by similar Syrian measures. According to information circulating in relevant circles, the Iraqi move carried a warning message stating that any military action against Hezbollah launched from Syrian territory, even if it is limited, may open the door to reactions from the PMF factions, which portends tension on the border between Iraq and Syria.
Official Lebanon is watching!
The irony is that Lebanese official levels, according to circulating information, are not far from the details of these accounts and movements. However, the Lebanese state does not seem to be dealing with the possibilities presented in a manner commensurate with its sensitivity.
This behavior is inseparable from the way it deals with other accusations related to the activity of Syrian groups inside Lebanese territory, including groups suspected of involvement in kidnapping and liquidation operations, and said to enjoy cover from influential parties in Damascus.
If these accusations require serious investigation, then the possibility of using Syrian territory as a launching pad for any military activity towards Lebanon requires a different approach, beyond just monitoring or relying on political guarantees.
On the other hand, another Lebanese opinion still rules out Damascus having the ability to wage a broad military confrontation with Lebanon, based on the reality of the current Syrian army, and the nature of the regional and international balances that do not encourage the outbreak of a direct confrontation into which the Lebanese army will slide.
Those who hold this opinion rely on the fact that the Lebanese army decided its position a while ago, and that it will not hesitate to respond to any attack launched from Syrian territory, regardless of the party behind it.
“Lebanon Debate” – Abdullah Qamh
