November 5, 2026
The International Monetary Fund mission will arrive in the Lebanese capital, Beirut, next Monday, on an anticipated visit that financial expectations indicate will lead to the signing of a staff-level agreement, according to what journalist Sabine Owais revealed in Al-Nahar newspaper.
Informed financial sources reported that the previous delay in reaching this agreement was due to the International Monetary Fund’s dissatisfaction with the President of the Republic’s challenge to Article 3 of the Banking Reform Law. This is the article that the Fund had previously requested to be amended by dropping the reference of the Monetary and Credit Law in implementation and relying instead on international standards. However, this resentment was contained through extensive communications during which the Lebanese side explained that the appeal was limited to a single article, and that it aimed to strengthen the law without disrupting its implementation.
However, these developments, which coincide with the imminent signing of the agreement, raised financial auditors’ concerns about what they described as an attempt to impose the “Mali Taif Agreement.” This fear is represented by efforts to strip the Central Bank of its powers with the aim of reshaping its structure under the guise of reform and restructuring of the banking sector. This is an issue that goes beyond technical and administrative amendments to raise major questions about the future of the independence of the monetary institution and the party that will control its decision.
The trend towards redistributing powers became clear during the preparation of the bank restructuring law, following the introduction of amendments to the composition of the Supreme Banking Authority that grant the Chairman of the Banking Control Commission the right to vote, and expand the influence of government-appointed members. This trend heralds the transfer of the supervisory center of gravity from the Bank of Lebanon to a body more subject to political balances.
Conducting a comprehensive review of the Monetary and Credit Law – in parallel with the restructuring of the Bank of Lebanon – is a major requirement of the International Monetary Fund. Given that this law represents the legislative framework regulating the monetary and banking system, the powers of the central bank, and its relationship with the financial sector, reconsidering it affects the foundations of the monetary system and the independence of the central institution. The references confirm that there is an urgent need to strengthen governance, transparency, auditing, and oversight at the Bank of Lebanon, but the difference remains vast between correcting structural imbalances, dismantling institutional guarantees, and transferring powers to bodies vulnerable to political tensions.
On the other hand, the urgent economic priorities emerge: determining the state’s financial obligations, restructuring the public debt, addressing the financial gap, recapitalizing banks, determining the hierarchy of rights and claims, and developing realistic mechanisms to recover depositors’ money.
The fundamental question remains related to the extent of the need to reform the Bank of Lebanon, its goals, the guarantees regulating it, and the interest of those it serves. While improving performance and governance is an indispensable path, reducing the powers of the governor and the Central Council in favor of bodies appointed by the political authority seems closer to a redistribution of power and influence than to institutional reform. The irony lies in the attempt of the political system, whose failures led to the financial collapse, to expand its grip on the institution concerned with dealing with its consequences. Which fuels fears of repeating the same political patterns in the monetary sector, turning the “Financial Taif” into a new settlement that empties responsibilities and dissipates powers without returning deposits to their owners.
