“Lebanon Debate” – Walid Khoury
Ali Al-Taher Heights, east of Nabatieh, is no longer just a military site on the map of the south. The hill has turned into a knot that summarizes an entire crisis: Israel wants the Lebanese army to enter it and search Hezbollah facilities there, while the party refuses to hand over a strategic site under fire and before the Israeli forces withdraw. Between the two conditions, the June truce faces the most serious test since its approval.
At an altitude of approximately 600 metres, Ali Al-Taher overlooks Nabatieh, Kafr Benit and the slopes leading to Iqlim Al-Tuffah. According to information provided by Lebanon Debate, the heights include underground military facilities, command centers, and supply lines belonging to Hezbollah, which explains the party’s adherence to them and Israel’s insistence on subjecting them to inspection.
Israeli reports indicate that Tel Aviv is demanding that the Lebanese army enter the complex and verify the removal of the military structure inside it. On the other hand, Israel is preparing for the possibility of carrying out an operation to control the highlands if the file cannot be resolved through the framework agreement, amid American attempts to keep any movement limited to avoid the collapse of the negotiating track.
Here the “deadly equation” is formed: Israel does not want to withdraw before verifying the dismantling of the party’s facilities, while Hezbollah refuses to surrender before the raids stop and the Israeli withdrawal occurs. As for the army, it finds itself facing a very sensitive internal mission that requires a political decision, national cover, and guarantees that prevent it from being targeted or pushed into friction with the party.
Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem did not directly name Ali Al-Taher in his last speech, but he rejected the framework agreement and the verification mechanism, considering that Israel wants to subject the army’s deployment, operations, and internal details to oversight. He also renewed his refusal to give up weapons before stopping the attacks and withdrawing.
In practice, this position means that the party does not view the handover of Ali Al-Taher as a natural transition to state power, but rather a concession extracted under Israeli pressure. Here the dispute becomes deeper than the fate of Talla: Will the army deploy as the sovereign, or enter a site under bombardment to implement Israeli conditions?
The army is authorized, under the security annex to the Framework Agreement, to lead operations to remove illegal weapons and disable tunnels, warehouses and command centers, and then assume exclusive operational control. But his experience in Faron, Srifa, and Zawtar al-Gharbiya showed that the deployment took place after the withdrawal of Israeli forces and in coordination with the Military Coordination Group for Lebanon MCG4L, and not through a single raid on the party’s sites.
Here, a distinction must be made between the June 20 truce and the framework agreement signed in Washington on June 26. The first reduced the level of fighting without stopping the raids and violations, while the second set a conditional path for Israeli redeployment, removal of weapons, entry of the army, and verification of implementation.
The “model areas” are based on 4 stages: the removal of militants and non-state military structures, a third party verifying the removal process, the army’s deployment and assuming control, then the start of reconstruction and the return of the population.
The problem is that this model did not decide the order of the steps in a way that would prevent disruption. Israel demands verification first, while Lebanon needs a withdrawal and a halt to the raids so that the army can carry out its mission without appearing as if it is working under Israeli conditions.
As for Washington, it supports two parallel paths: a gradual Israeli withdrawal and a documented disarmament of Hezbollah. In theory, it rejects a permanent Israeli presence inside Lebanon, but it has not yet provided a guarantee that would prevent Israel from trying to eliminate Ali Al-Taher militarily.
The possible way out is not to ask one party to start, but rather to implement simultaneously: a binding Israeli cessation of raids, a documented withdrawal from an agreed-upon area, the army entering Ali al-Tahir and inspecting its facilities, and then a third party verifying the removal of the military structure.
This formula grants the state actual sovereignty, prevents Israel from using the refusal to surrender as an excuse for progress, and also allows Hezbollah to present its withdrawal as a surrender to the army, not a surrender to Israel.
But the conditions for a solution are not yet ripe. Israel wants to guarantee the result before withdrawal, and the party wants to withdraw before handover, while the state is unable to impose a simultaneous commitment on both parties.
Ali Al-Taher is not just a military position crisis. It is a test of the concept of sovereignty and the state’s ability to regain both land and weapons.
If the Israeli withdrawal, army deployment, and handover of sites remain steps conditional on each other, the hill will remain a burning fuse. The June truce may fall, not because the decision to go to war was taken, but because everyone is waiting for the other party to step first.
