November 13, 2026
“Lebanon Debate” – Walid Khoury
Bilal Erdogan is not just a president’s son visiting Lebanon to participate in a cultural or social activity. When the son of the Turkish president arrives in Beirut, meets with the President of the Republic and the Mufti of the Republic, and heads towards Tripoli and Akkar, it becomes difficult to separate the visit from Ankara’s calculations in the region.
The real question is not what Bilal Erdogan is doing in Lebanon, but rather what does Türkiye want from Lebanon at this particular stage?
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the balance of power has changed in the Levant. Türkiye, which has expanded its presence in Syria, now views Lebanon as an important geographical, economic and political extension. It is natural for it to seek to expand its influence in a country where traditional regional roles are declining, and where alliances and balances are changing.
But the most important thing lies in choosing Tripoli and Akkar. North Lebanon is not just a social stop on the visit’s schedule, but rather a region that enjoys historical and cultural ties with Türkiye, and constitutes a potential gateway to building a long-term Turkish presence.
Here the most sensitive issue arises: Is Ankara seeking to fill part of the political vacuum in the Lebanese Sunni arena?
There is no announced data proving that Türkiye is working to create an alternative Sunni leadership, but the Turkish interest in the north, coupled with communication with religious and political authorities, opens the door to a reading that goes beyond the humanitarian nature of the visit.
Ankara does not necessarily need to create a political party or adopt a local leader in order to expand its influence. It is enough to build a network of educational and cultural institutions, investments, and social relations, so that it will, over time, become a regional reference present in Lebanese accounts.
However, the potential Turkish ambition does not stop at the Sunni arena. Bilal Erdogan’s meeting with President Joseph Aoun, and his declaration of support for the sovereignty of the state and the Lebanese army, suggest Ankara’s desire to present itself as a partner of the state, not just a force linked to a specific Lebanese component.
Here, the military and financial cooperation agreement with Türkiye, which was approved by the House of Representatives in conjunction with the visit, gains additional significance. The influence that starts from culture and development may be accompanied by formal cooperation in the economy, security, and defense, without this necessarily meaning the existence of a hidden Turkish plan or an undeclared political agreement.
What seems clear is that Turkey wants an advanced seat in the new Lebanon: a presence in the north, relations with Sunni authorities, partnership with official institutions, opportunities for reconstruction and investment, and a position in the equations that will arise between Beirut and Damascus.
As for Bilal Erdogan, he may be the appropriate person to open these doors away from the complications that accompany official political visits.
Did Türkiye come to help Lebanon, or to consolidate its position in a country within which influence is being redistributed?
The two possibilities are not contradictory. Countries provide aid and seek interests at the same time.
But what is worth monitoring is not what was said in the official meetings, but rather what comes after them: Who will Ankara support? Where will you invest? With whom will she build her alliances?
The visit may end within days, while the presence that Türkiye seeks to build may be a project for years.
