“Lebanon Debate” – Walid Khoury
On July 2, 2026, Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Al-Shaibani carried out one of the largest tours undertaken by a Syrian official in Lebanon since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. He met with the President of the Republic, Joseph Aoun, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nabih Berri, and the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, and visited Dar Al-Fatwa, Bkerke, Clemenceau, Maarab, and the Phalange House, before moving to Tripoli and meeting its authorities.
But amid the crowding of official, political and religious stations, a station with exceptional symbolism was absent: the tomb of the martyr Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.
The announced tour did not include Al-Shaibani standing in front of the shrine, which, for a large segment of the Lebanese, summarizes the stage of confrontation with Syrian tutelage and the assassination that changed the history of Lebanon. This absence raised public questions at the time, especially since a visit to the shrine would have given the new Syria an opportunity to declare a symbolic break with the legacy of the Assad regime in Lebanon.
But the significance did not stop at the shrine. An initial program circulating before Al-Shaibani’s arrival included a meeting with former MP Bahia Hariri, but the meeting did not take place, and no meeting with a member of the Hariri family was announced during the tour. Press information reported that the station was canceled at the last minute, without issuing an official clarification explaining the reasons for modifying the program.
As for Saad Hariri, who announced in February 2026 that he intended to visit Syria before regional circumstances postponed his date, he has not yet met President Ahmed Al-Sharaa. According to information provided to Lebanon Debate, Hariri did not receive an official invitation from the Syrian leadership, despite his announcement that the Future Movement would return to running in the elections 4 years after suspending his personal political activity.
None of these facts alone is sufficient to say that Damascus decided to target Hariri or enter into a confrontation with her. The lack of communication may be a natural result of Saad Hariri’s retreat from direct political action, while the Syrian leadership chose to deal with officials in power and institutions active on the ground.
But the combination of these facts with an escalating political, judicial and institutional process raises a legitimate question: Will Damascus rebuild its influence in Lebanon without going through the middle house?
The clearest path goes through the presidency of the government. The relationship between Beirut and Damascus did not remain limited to visits and statements, but rather moved to a broad institutional framework with the signing of the agreement by Nawaf Salam and Al-Shaibani to establish the “Joint Lebanese-Syrian Higher Committee.”
The agreement establishes a framework for coordination in political, diplomatic, economic, judicial and security affairs, in addition to borders, energy, transportation, education and communications files. It also allows for the establishment of sectoral committees, following up on bilateral agreements and arrangements, and proposing their amendment or development.
This formula gives the Prime Minister of Lebanon a key position in managing the relationship with Damascus, the same position that has historically constituted one of the sources of Harirism’s political power and its role in managing Lebanon’s Arab relations. However, the difference this time is that Nawaf Salam, not Saad Hariri, stands at the heart of the new network that Syria is weaving with the Lebanese state.
The relationship between Salam and Sharaa developed through visits and meetings that dealt with borders, economics, energy, and security coordination. In this sense, Damascus does not need to search for a traditional Sunni ally, in the manner adopted by the Assad regime, as long as it is able to build a direct relationship with the prime minister and official institutions.
From politics, the Syrian presence moved to a more sensitive area, which is the judiciary. Since the beginning of 2026, the Chargé d’Affaires of the Syrian Embassy, Iyad Al-Hazzaa, has repeatedly met with the two cassation public prosecutors in Lebanon, first with Judge Jamal Al-Hajjar, then with his successor, Judge Ahmed Rami Al-Hajj.
In March, Al-Hazza discussed with Al-Hajjar the implementation of the convict transfer agreement signed between the two countries. After Al-Hajj assumed his position, Al-Hazza visited him twice at the Palace of Justice, before Al-Hajj visited the Syrian embassy on July 18, where the files of Syrian and Lebanese convicts who might be in Syrian prisons were discussed, and the possibility of developing judicial agreements between the two countries.
Thus, the Syrian embassy is no longer satisfied with managing diplomatic communication, but rather has become present in a judicial workshop that includes those convicted, detained, wanted, and all other common files between Beirut and Damascus.
According to information provided to Lebanon Debate, the Syrian side presented to Lebanese parties lists that included the names of a large number of figures whose files Damascus is following. Then came the file of former Syrian Major General Adel Issa to provide the first practical model for the transition of this coordination from meetings and information exchange to implementing a recovery request.
In early August, Issa went to the Syrian embassy in Beirut to complete an administrative transaction. The embassy informed the Lebanese authorities of his presence, before the criminal investigation department arrested him. After interrogating him, the Cassation Public Prosecution decided to extradite him to Damascus in accordance with the Lebanese-Syrian judicial treaty of 1951, to stand trial on charges against him dating back to his period of service in the previous regime.
The decision raised legal and legal questions regarding guarantees of defense, asylum, and a fair trial, but at the same time it set a political and judicial precedent, as it was the first handover of a senior officer from the former regime to the new Syrian authorities.
Information from Lebanon Debate, citing sources familiar with the file, reveals that the Prime Minister pushed strongly towards completing the handover process. If this information reveals the nature of the decision that was taken, it shows that cooperation between the Serail and Damascus went beyond managing bilateral relations, and reached the fulfillment of a very sensitive Syrian request.
As for the third path, it passes through the Sunni environment itself, specifically through the gate of Dar al-Fatwa, which, throughout the period of the rise of Haririism, formed the central religious authority for the Sunni sect, and maintained a close relationship with the leadership of Rafik Hariri and then Saad Hariri, without losing its independent institutional position.
In this context, Al-Shaibani visited Dar Al-Fatwa and held a meeting in the presence of Mufti Abdul Latif Derian, the head of the Sunni Sharia courts, the Fatwa Secretary, a number of regional muftis and officials of religious institutions and endowments. Al-Shaibani conveyed Al-Sharaa’s greetings to Derian, while the Mufti praised the new Syrian leadership’s adherence to Lebanon’s sovereignty and unity.
It is natural for Dar Al-Fatwa to be a major stop on the tour of a senior Arab official, and the visit in itself does not constitute evidence of an attempt to bypass Harirism. But it acquires a different political dimension when placed alongside the absence of declared communication with Saad Hariri, the failure to meet with Bahiya Hariri, and the expansion of Syrian contacts with multiple Sunni figures and authorities.
Lebanon Debate information also reveals meetings held by Damascus with figures who disagree with Mufti Derian or aspire to play advanced roles in the next stage. These meetings are not enough to say that Syria has actually entered the battle for the caliphate of Derian, but they have raised questions within the Sunni environment about Damascus’s early interest in the map of the future religious authority, and about the position it seeks to reserve in the post-Mufti phase.
This scene becomes more sensitive with talk behind the scenes about Saudi-Syrian coordination in a number of Lebanese files. If this coordination includes arranging the Sunni house or managing the next stage, we may be facing a broader regional restructuring of the Sunni authority, and not a unilateral Syrian attempt to target or exclude Hariri.
What is confirmed so far is that Al-Sharaa does not engage in a declared confrontation with Saad Hariri, just as Hariri did not declare a rivalry with the new Syrian leadership, but rather spoke about it positively and expressed his desire to visit Damascus.
But politics is not measured only by statements, but also by who is invited, who is received, who sits at the decision table, and who remains outside the new network of relationships.
From this angle, Damascus appears to be building its Lebanese presence through multiple doors: the government palace, the joint higher committee, the public prosecution, the embassy, Dar al-Fatwa, and communications with various political and religious forces. On the other hand, Saad Hariri remains outside the declared Syrian communication network until now.
This may be a Syrian decision to bypass Harirism, and it may be a natural result of the space left by its leader’s retreat. But the political result is the same: New Damascus is advancing inside Lebanon without having to pass through the center.
Is Ahmed Al-Sharaa intentionally building his influence on the ruins of Haririyism, or is Syria simply filling a void that Haririyism left open?
