In an important development witnessed in the Lebanese-Israeli conflict, the two parties returned to the direct negotiating table after a break of 43 years, in a step that brings to mind one of the most sensitive periods in Lebanon’s political history, and opens a new negotiating door in light of the ongoing war in the south.
The phrase “after 43 years” refers to the last direct negotiating experience between Lebanon and Israel, which was the “May 17, 1983 Agreement,” which was described at the time as a draft peace agreement reached under American auspices, under exceptional circumstances that followed the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the arrival of the Israeli army in Beirut.
This agreement did not come out of nowhere, but was preceded by a negotiating process that began in late 1982 in the coastal town of Khalde, where direct sessions were held between the two sides under American sponsorship. Israel was represented in those talks by David Kimhi, one of the most prominent Mossad officials, while the Lebanese delegation was headed by diplomat Antoine Fattal, under the indirect supervision of US Secretary of State George Shultz through his envoy, Maurice Draper.
The agreement stipulated the cancellation of the state of war between Lebanon and Israel, and the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanese territory within a period ranging between 8 and 12 weeks, in exchange for security arrangements on the border, which included the establishment of a security zone inside Lebanon, and the formation of joint committees under American supervision to follow up on implementation.
It also included provisions stipulating mutual recognition of the right of both Lebanon and Israel to live in peace, while opening the door to establishing liaison offices between the two parties, without reaching the level of full diplomatic relations, in an attempt to achieve a balance between international pressures and internal sensitivities.
However, this path quickly faced a divided Lebanese reality, as the agreement was met with widespread popular and political rejection, especially from forces supported by Syria, which considered the agreement a “submission agreement.” An opposition front was formed that included prominent figures such as Nabih Berri, Walid Jumblatt, and Suleiman Franjieh, which led to widespread internal escalation.
This division did not remain in the political framework, but was embodied on the ground through pivotal events, most notably the uprising of February 6, 1984, and the Mountain War, in addition to the escalation of major security operations, including the bombing of the US Marine headquarters in Beirut, which plunged the country into a more turbulent phase and made the agreement lose any chance of continuing.
In light of this scene, and with the impossibility of implementing the terms of the agreement on the ground, it was practically dropped in 1984, before President Amin Gemayel officially announced its cancellation on March 5 of the same year, in a move that reflected the extent of the internal and regional pressures that surrounded it.
Since that date, Lebanese-Israeli relations have not witnessed any direct and public negotiations at this level, and communication has been limited to indirect channels, as happened in the April 1996 understanding, or in the maritime border demarcation negotiations in 2022 with American mediation.
Today, with the launch of talks in Washington, this type of meetings is returning to the forefront, but in a completely different context, as negotiations do not come after a war that has ended, but rather in the midst of an ongoing confrontation, and in light of a daily military escalation in southern Lebanon.
According to the data, this round is classified as a “founding session” aimed at setting a general framework for negotiations, amid a clear Lebanese adherence to a ceasefire as a gateway to any progress, in exchange for an Israeli tendency to continue negotiations in parallel with military operations.
In conclusion, returning to the negotiating table after 43 years reflects a transformation imposed by field realities and international pressure, but at the same time it reopens a page in a complex Lebanese history, whose title was the “May 17 Agreement,” which collapsed under internal and external pressure.
Will the experience be repeated, with all its divisions and failures? Or did the balance of power and regional and international transformations succeed this time in imposing a different path?
