October 14, 2026
The Israeli “Alma” Center reviewed, in a report prepared by researcher Dana Pollak, the repercussions of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces’ seizure of a car transporting hundreds of kilograms of explosives on October 5, 2026, while it was preparing to smuggle them from the Baalbek area towards the southern suburb. The report concluded by presenting several possible scenarios for the purpose of the shipment, ranging from its use in political assassinations, preparing explosive devices against the Israeli army in the south, replacing weapons stockpiles, or producing rockets, mortar shells, and drones, in addition to the possibility of using it to carry out violent operations inside Lebanon.
According to the report, Hezbollah’s “Unit 112” is responsible for the logistical transport of weapons and military equipment within Lebanese territory. The Center linked the hypothesis of carrying out assassinations to the ongoing conflict over disarming the party, considering that this step may reflect a preparation for internal confrontation against political or security figures that threaten the survival of its arsenal, while it may be used against Israel through “special operations” in the security zone in southern Lebanon or deep inside Israel.
The report pointed out that this incident occurred with two other smuggling attempts through the Syrian corridor. The first was on October 1, during which the Lebanese army thwarted the entry of about 245 kilograms of TNT along with explosive devices and components, and the second was on the 9th of the same month, when artillery shells and 24 kilograms of the same substance were seized in the Qusayr-Hermel area. Although the report did not confirm the existence of a direct link between the shipments, it considered it evidence of the continued exploitation of the Syrian corridor – even after the fall of the Assad regime – to rebuild the party’s capabilities and replenish its reserves.
The report touched on questions about the reasons for the passage of a shipment of this size through the well-known Dahr al-Baydar checkpoint, suggesting that either the party bet on crossing it without serious inspection out of confidence in its influence on the main roads, or assuming that its contents would be recovered if it was seized. In this context, he recalled the Al-Kahala incident on August 9, 2023, following a weapons truck overturn and clashes that led to two deaths, in addition to the Tayouneh Roundabout incident on January 23, 2026, when party members prevented a security patrol from inspecting two trucks believed to have transported military equipment from Syria.
In an alternative reading, the report assumed that the Dahr al-Baydar shipment may have been thrown as “bait” to distract the attention of the security services, test their readiness for any action against the party, and evaluate its repercussions. He also proposed the hypothesis that it was a psychologically threatening message directed at figures calling for disarmament, such that its exposure was intended to demonstrate military capabilities and the high cost of confrontation, not just an operational failure.
The ALMA Center concluded its report by noting that the seizure of explosives opens the door to broader questions about the size of remaining stocks and shipments that passed undetected. He considered that the state’s real test goes beyond the confiscation of a single shipment, and extends to the extent of its ability to dismantle networks, prosecute those involved, and prevent future transfers, thus proving its ability to translate the decision to restrict weapons into practical reality.
