In the face of pressure … the army imposes an equation of balance

Between the American pressure papers and the maneuvers of the interior, the army came out with its plan about the weapon, not only as a technical document, but as a new demarcation of the rules of the game. What was placed on the table was not a road map towards the solution. Rather, it was an explicit declaration that the military establishment refuses to turn into a tool in the conflict of others, and adheres to its right to determine the timing and direction according to the conditions of reality, not the delusions of politics.
The plan that was presented to the cabinet without time, and in gradient stages, has linked any field move to stopping the aggression and withdrawal The timeless coincidence, but rather a reflection of the field realism that imposes itself. The military is aware that the current capabilities are limited, and that any move needs qualitative support in many technical, engineering and logistical capabilities. Therefore, the plan was formulated on the basis that the final decision remains in the hands of the army, moving according to its energy and the circumstances of each region, not according to the rhythm of its lines abroad. Perhaps the choice of the Shiite ministers to withdraw from the session, the result of their awareness that their survival would have given legitimacy to the decisions of the fifth and seventh of August, decisions they consider to be a charter, and they deal with it as if it were not. This position was not a passing action, but rather a calculated step to avoid any slide in the upcoming sessions towards options that Prime Minister Nawaf Salam may push, which may open the door to paths they do not want.
In the essence of what was crystallized, two basic points emerged: The first is that the plan was devoid of any binding schedule, and the second is that the army refused to restrict itself with prior dates, preferring to comment on its capabilities and field conditions, based on clear technical justifications. This approach relieved the “duo” as the leadership of the military establishment rested, because it kept the door open to the move without entering into suffocating obligations. The linking of the implementation to the commitment of the Israeli and Syrian parties came to give the state a stronger position, and allows it to claim a political price from Washington instead of dependence on its pressure. However, the “duo” is still cautious despite the result that came out with the session, fearing that the upcoming meetings will carry political bombs on the passion of the prime minister. On the other hand, the army kept its plan open without a schedule, providing clear technical justifications that secured a margin of maneuver that protects it from heavy obligations and gives political forces an opportunity to capture balance. However, this progress does not eliminate caution. The settlement that was born from the political climate surrounding the plan provided a phased outlet, but it kept the mines in place, especially with everyone realizing that the outside is still awaiting to hold the game threads whenever the opportunity arises. And when the experiment proved that the American paper lost its value after Israel showed a clear intransigence, the bet on an internal decisiveness seemed to be an illusion that was soon exposed to the facts. Thus, what happened was not considered the end of the battle, but rather a station in a long path that will remain dependent on the balance of regional powers. The army chose realism to protect itself from getting involved in an internal clash or an external trap, and the political class resorted to a temporary settlement that prevents the explosion, while the outside is watching to see how the Lebanese paper can be used in a broader game. The result is that Lebanon has not yet decided its choice, but it was able to impose a more balanced equation: there is no implementation without conditions, nor a commitment without free. At a time when the country is intended to be converted into a permissible square, fixing this principle is considered a strategic gain, even if it is temporary, because the actual battle has not started yet, and because the following may be heavier and more complicated than what the Lebanese have witnessed until now.