“Lebanon Debate” – Walid Khoury
President Joseph Aoun returned from Washington stronger politically, but he did not return with stronger tools on the ground. His meetings at the White House, the State Department, and Congress repositioned the presidency at the heart of the relationship between Lebanon and the United States, but the practical results remained below the level of complete transformation. There is no final Israeli withdrawal, no binding timetable, no funds ready for reconstruction, and no exceptional armament program for the Lebanese army. The visit succeeded in opening the door to a new path, but its actual results will be determined in the south and when approaching the file of Hezbollah’s weapons.
The first positive of the visit is that it returned Lebanon to the White House as a state. During the past years, Washington dealt with Lebanon through separate files that included the army, sanctions, Hezbollah, the borders, the Bank of Lebanon, and aid, while the President of the Republic attended this time in his capacity as the representative of the state and the party with whom the American administration wants to negotiate about the next stage. This development gave Aoun clear internal weight, and showed that Washington is betting on the President of the Republic and the army in the project to restore the state to its decision-making power, but this bet remains linked to their ability to take actual steps in the files of weapons, borders, and institutions.
The second positive thing is that Aoun succeeded politically in establishing a more balanced equation than the Israeli proposal. This equation is based on a gradual Israeli withdrawal, matched by the deployment of the army and the extension of state authority, which prevents obligations from being limited to the Lebanese side alone. It is no longer required that the state disarm Hezbollah and then wait for an Israeli decision to withdraw. Rather, the path is now based on reciprocal steps that begin with Israel’s withdrawal from an area and the army’s entry into it before moving to a new phase. This equation gives the state an important internal argument, as it can say that restoring the land is possible through the army and political decision, but Israel has not yet committed to a clear end to the path, and the transition between its stages remains linked to an American and Israeli assessment of Lebanese performance.
The third positive thing is that the army emerged from the visit as the central institution in any future settlement. Talk about him is no longer limited to aid, salaries, and fuel. Rather, he is now required to take over the territories, control the borders, prevent the rebuilding of military sites, and protect stability. This transformation serves the state’s project politically, but it opens serious military questions about the army’s ability to carry out these missions, especially since it requires long-term equipment, arming, and support. No final American commitments have yet emerged that are commensurate with the size of the responsibilities placed on its shoulders, as political support is still greater than the capabilities that the army has actually acquired.
The fourth positive thing is that Aoun linked the arms file to the economic and reconstruction files. The south is not only a military map, but an area that includes destroyed villages, displaced families, suspended institutions, and people who want to return to their homes. The state cannot demand a change in the security reality while it is unable to rebuild and provide services and job opportunities. Linking security to reconstruction was a correct strategic step, because any vacuum left by the state would be filled by someone with money, services, and the ability to support the population, but this file remained in the realm of promises. There is no ready fund, no specific financing conference, and no announced numbers, which means that reconstruction has entered the discussion without yet turning into a financial commitment.
The fifth positive is that the visit gave Lebanon an additional opportunity to avoid open war. Aoun presented the Lebanese state as a party trying to restore decision-making and extend the authority of institutions, and this position helped separate official Lebanon from Hezbollah. This chapter gives Washington a reason to give the political track a chance before returning to the military option, but this opportunity remains limited. Political protection may decline if the state fails to implement its obligations or if the internal path falters.
On the other hand, the visit carried heavy negatives, the first of which was that Aoun did not obtain a clear timetable for the Israeli withdrawal. What has begun is a limited and conditional withdrawal that can be stopped at any stage, which allows Israel to claim that Lebanese implementation is insufficient and to use this claim to justify its continued presence. The danger lies in the transformation of the temporary presence into a long-term presence, and that villages and sites remain under occupation while displacement continues and reconstruction is delayed.
The second negative relates to the verification mechanism. The party that will decide that a certain area has become free of weapons has not been decided, nor has the extent of Israel’s acceptance of the Lebanese army’s reports, nor the rules for inspecting private property, or the role of international committees, been decided. These details may become the main reason for disrupting the process, as the army could announce the completion of its mission while Israel rejects the result. Then the withdrawal stops and the strikes return, and Lebanon becomes stuck between external conditions and internal objections.
The third negative is that Washington has raised the ceiling required of Aoun to a level that may exceed the state’s capacity. What is required is to limit weapons, dismantle the military structure, stop funding, control borders, prevent rearmament, implement reforms, and provide security guarantees, while the state faces a financial crisis, institutional weakness, and political division. American support gave Aoun political power, but it also placed on him a great responsibility, with the support potentially turning into pressure if he was unable to achieve the desired results.
The fourth negative is the risk of internal conflict. Hezbollah’s weapons are not an administrative file that can be closed by a government decision, because the party considers them part of its existence and its internal and regional role. Any quick or coercive attempt to remove him may open the door to confrontation with the army, and may also lead to tension within the Shiite environment and division within state institutions. Aoun needs a gradual path that stops rearmament, controls financing, dismantles military capabilities, and expands the state’s presence without pushing Lebanon into an internal war. This path is possible in theory but very difficult in practice.
The fifth negative is linking the economy and reconstruction to the security file. Washington wants to see progress in the arms file before opening the door to full support, and this equation gives the state an incentive, but it makes the Lebanese hostages of a file that they do not have the ability to resolve. Reconstruction funds, army support, and economic aid may be disrupted if political understanding falters, and then the citizen will pay the price of the conflict between the state, Hezbollah, Israel, and the United States.
In conclusion, Aoun’s visit was politically successful, but it was not a decisive visit. Lebanon regained its position in Washington, the president received direct support, the army was placed at the heart of the settlement, withdrawal was linked to the spread of the state, and reconstruction entered the discussion. However, the crucial files remained open, as Israel did not specify a date for its exit, the verification mechanism was not decided, the army has not yet obtained everything it needs, reconstruction funds have not arrived, and Hezbollah has not announced its willingness to give up its weapons.
Aoun returned from Washington stronger in policy, but no longer stronger in implementation. Washington gave him a chance and returned him to Lebanon with a very dangerous mission, based on proving the state’s ability to fill the vacuum, the army’s ability to take over the land, and the possibility of dealing with Hezbollah’s weapons without blowing up the country. The success of the visit will not be measured by the photo of Aoun with Trump, but rather by what will happen after the photo, and by whether Israel will withdraw from new areas, and whether the army will receive weapons and support, and whether reconstruction will begin, and whether Aoun will be able to transfer American support to a Lebanese path that does not end in an internal war. Therefore, the visit to Washington remains an important beginning of a long path that has no conclusion.
