Member of the “Loyalty to the Resistance” bloc, MP Hassan Ezz El-Din, confirmed that Hezbollah “is in its court and on its land,” and is still, in his words, a key player in the conflict with Israel, stressing that the party will not abandon its role and right to defend its land, its people, its rights, and its wealth.

In a press statement, Ezz El-Din launched a sharp attack on the framework agreement between Lebanon and Israel, considering it to be an agreement in which “Lebanon surrenders completely and gives up its sovereignty and land to the benefit of Israel,” describing it as an “instrument of surrender” and “worse than the May 17 agreement,” and that it is “not worth the ink on which it was written.”

Izz al-Din saw that what is happening in the course of direct negotiations constitutes, as he described it, “shame and humiliation,” considering that the authority is committing a serious mistake by sitting with Israel and negotiating with it, and that the results that emerged from this path are “disastrous” for Lebanon and its sovereignty.

He pointed out that the agreement did not include any clear timetable for Israel’s withdrawal from the lands it entered, pointing out that talk about “experimental areas” does not dispel fears, but rather reveals, in his opinion, an Israeli attempt to put the Lebanese army facing the resistance and its environment.

Ezz El-Din considered that the resistance weapon is “the most important card” abandoned by the authority, stressing that this weapon, according to him, is intended to defend the homeland and the people when the state is unable to carry out its duties, and stressing that no authority has the right to sign an agreement that amounts to surrender.

He stressed that “what is built on falsehood remains void and will not fall with time,” referring to his refusal to acknowledge any political or national implications of the framework agreement, considering that this agreement constitutes a detail in Lebanese political life.

In the regional context, Ezz El-Din indicated that Lebanon was included in the Islamabad negotiations, and that Tehran considered Beirut to have priority in all other understandings, indicating the interconnection of the Lebanese file with the ongoing regional tracks.

He revealed that Hezbollah will conduct an evaluation of the agreement with its allies, especially the Amal Movement, to determine the mechanisms required to deal with the next stage, pointing out that the popular movements that followed the announcement of the agreement are normal and reflect, according to him, the people’s lack of confidence in authority.

Ezzedine’s positions come in light of the escalation of internal debate over the framework agreement, between those who see it as an opportunity to stop the escalation and rearrange the situation in the south, and those who see it as an unbalanced agreement that affects Lebanese sovereignty and opens the door to new internal and political tensions.

This position brings back to the forefront the memory of the May 17, 1983 agreement, which remained in Lebanese political discourse a symbol of agreements that were popularly and politically rejected, due to its connection to negotiations with Israel in light of the pressing balance of power. Hence, Hezbollah is trying to place the framework agreement in the same context, as a turning point that calls for a broad political confrontation, not just a passing objection.