“Lebanon Debate”
In the midst of overlapping regional and international negotiating tracks, the Lebanon arena is emerging again as one of the most sensitive and complex files in the calculations of conflict and calm in the region. Between Washington and Tehran, and amid attempts to reduce escalation and contain tension, several papers intersect in which Lebanon does not seem to be merely a secondary issue, but rather a testing ground for balances of influence and the limits of indirect understandings.
While reports talk about ideas for field follow-up mechanisms for the ceasefire in the south, questions are rising about the feasibility of these frameworks in light of the absence of key parties from the direct negotiating table, and the multiplicity of paths between Switzerland, Washington and others, which raises question marks about the unity of the vision and the possibility of establishing long-term stability.
In this context, writer and political analyst Ali Hamadeh confirmed in an interview with “Lebanon Debate” that Lebanon’s paper was at the forefront of the talks, and was the first item that the Iranians insisted on discussing in order to stabilize the ceasefire and reduce tension with the Americans in the region, while the Americans accepted this matter for one simple reason, which is that they are committed to continuing the negotiations and do not want to miss the opportunity to negotiate.
He believes that this matter, in any case, is not related to Lebanon as Lebanon, but rather related to the status of Iranian influence in Lebanon, especially since Iran considers that the comprehensive ceasefire and Israel’s withdrawal are in the interest of preserving Lebanon as a card in its hand, and as an Iranian platform through Hezbollah and its military control.
In this context, it is considered that the issue of disarmament is not on the table for the Iranians, and it is not on the table for Hezbollah either, and therefore stopping the war in Lebanon for the Iranians aims to preserve Hezbollah’s position.
He points out that in the media, it can be said that Iran presents this as serving Lebanon, but in practice it is a service to keep Hezbollah as a military and security force affiliated with Iran on Lebanese territory, and this is clear.
As for the “ceasefire cell,” it is practically difficult to consider them as side negotiations related to a ceasefire in the literal sense. Rather, they are related to how to reduce tension in southern Lebanon, for one simple reason, which is that there is a party that is not present at the table, which is the Israeli party.
In this context, he asks: “Practically, how can there be an effective ceasefire cell without the presence of the main party in the equation, which is the Israeli, versus the Iranian?” He explains that the United States can negotiate or act on behalf of Israel, but within limits, and it cannot make all the decisions on behalf of Israel.
He points out here that this is a very important point, especially since the Iranian speaks or negotiates on behalf of Hezbollah, considering that he is the one leading the war in Lebanon with Hezbollah, pointing out in this context that, to date, more than a hundred experts or officers from the Quds Force are still present in Lebanon, and they are working within the framework of supporting Hezbollah and leading operations alongside Hezbollah’s second- and third-ranking leaders, who assumed responsibility after the previous first-ranking leaders were killed.
In his speech, Hamadeh does not believe that the ceasefire will fully hold as it is now; It is an almost complete ceasefire, but its failure to hold is due to one simple reason, which is that the circumstances and reasons that led to the outbreak of this war have not changed, and remain the same. Consequently, there are still two forces confronting each other on Lebanese soil: the Iranians through Hezbollah, and the Israelis directly, who consider that the southern region represents their security depth, and that it constitutes a threat to the depth of Israeli territory.
As for the negotiations in Washington between Lebanon and Israel, it is clear that they are practically ongoing, and there is a political track that addresses all the existing conflicts between Lebanon and Israel, in an attempt to find solutions to them, and this Lebanese track is ongoing and ongoing.
But on the other hand, Hamadeh talks about chaos in the negotiating tracks between the Swiss track, the Washington track, the negotiation with the Iranians, and the negotiation with the Israelis, which has practically created a kind of confusion regarding this issue within American diplomacy.
He concludes by emphasizing that the Iranian-American negotiations will not end the war, for a fundamental reason, which is that as long as there is an armed force called Hezbollah on the ground, the Lebanon wars will not end.
