“Lebanon Debate” – Walid Khoury
On the day the Lebanese Army received news of the martyrdom of two officers and a soldier in an Israeli attack, the state was opening Qlayaat Airport. Between the two scenes, a complete picture of the relationship between the authority and the military establishment in Lebanon is summarized: an army that pays the price, and an authority that acts as if things are proceeding in their natural course.
The issue here is not related to the opening of an airport itself, but rather to the political message sent by the continuation of the official scene as usual on an exceptional day like this.
Some will say that countries are not run by emotions, that Lebanon cannot tolerate escalation, and that the ongoing negotiations with Israel remain a necessity to protect Lebanese interests and prevent a slide into wider confrontations. There may be a lot of truth in that. But no one calls for emotional or rash decisions. The issue is much simpler than that: What did the authority do to say that targeting the Lebanese army was not an ordinary incident?
The problem is not the continuation of negotiations nor the diplomatic options adopted by the state. The problem is that the Lebanese have not seen any step equivalent to the scale of the attack. They did not see a different political position, an unusual move, or a clear message internally and externally that targeting the military institution goes beyond the limits of a passing security incident.
In politics, symbolism is as important as decisions. States express their priorities through their actions as well as through their messages. When the fall of soldiers while performing their duty coincides with a major official celebration, the Lebanese have the right to ask: Did the authority really feel that what happened required a different position?
The irony is that the army is the institution that is called upon whenever politics falters. He is asked to protect borders, maintain security, confront dangers, and fill the void where other institutions are unable. When he succeeds, he is said to have done his duty. When it is targeted, it seems that the army’s willingness to defend the state is greater than the state’s willingness to defend it.
Here lies the problem.
The military institution, which has lost officers and members of its own, finds itself required to continue performing its duties in full, including participating in negotiating processes that the state deems necessary. This may be part of the national interest, and no one objects to the military institution carrying out its national duties regardless of the circumstances, but what is difficult to understand is the absence of any parallel political step that confirms that the blood of the military has not gone unnoticed.
It was not necessarily necessary to stop the negotiations or undermine the existing paths. But between continuing negotiations and being satisfied with statements of condemnation there is a wide range of political and diplomatic options. Here the legitimate question arises: Were any of these options used?
What was required was not to declare war, nor to blow up existing diplomatic tracks. But between these two options there is a wide range of political tools that countries resort to when their sovereign institutions are being targeted: an emergency government session, an exceptional diplomatic move, summoning the relevant ambassadors, or even a temporary suspension of any negotiating track until the circumstances of the crime become clear. Any step clearly indicates that targeting the Lebanese army is not an event that passes like any other.
The real crisis is not in what Israel did, but in the way the authorities dealt with what happened. When the Lebanese army is targeted, this is supposed to be reflected in the political performance of the state. As for the event passing as if it were a passing moment, this is the problem that deserves discussion.
The army does not need more speeches about sacrifice, honor and loyalty. He needs an authority that acts as if an attack on him is an attack on it. It needs a country that feels that its prestige is harmed when its soldiers are killed, and that its national dignity is targeted when its army is targeted.
The danger is not only in Israeli targeting, but in getting used to it. That the martyrdom of Lebanese soldiers becomes news that passes from one official occasion to another, and that the authority acts as if the institution for which it bears the burdens of the nation is always capable of paying the price alone.
Negotiations may be a national necessity, and their continuation may be an option imposed by the state’s calculations. But what cannot be justified is that the army is asked to continue performing its duty after burying its comrades, while the authority is unable to take a single step that suggests that their blood imposed a political position equal to the size of the sacrifices they made. Then the issue becomes not just a new Israeli aggression, but rather turns into a big question about a country that asks its army to defend it every time, while it does not succeed in convincing the Lebanese that it dealt with targeting it with the seriousness it deserves.
