The Israeli military establishment began to speak with unprecedented concern about the “nightmare” imposed by the bomb-laden drones in the skies of the northern front, with admissions within the Israeli army that the confrontation with this threat was not at the level of danger, while attempts to devise urgent field solutions are accelerating for fear of the phenomenon spreading from southern Lebanon to the Israeli interior and other regions.

According to a report by journalist Ben Caspit in the Israeli newspaper “Maariv”, the Israeli army admits in closed sessions that “the preparation and response to the threat of visual drones was not good,” and that the solutions that have been developed so far are “insufficient.”

The report says that the Israeli army was busy during the past years preparing for a large-scale war with Iran, precision ballistic missiles, and Hezbollah’s missile arsenal, which led to reducing the danger of “small flying objects,” before they turned today into a daily threat pursuing Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon.

According to Maariv, the army command is currently working on a three-stage plan that includes: early warning, fortification, and then rapid interception of the drones before they explode.

In this context, radar and audio sensing systems are being developed that are capable of detecting drones and giving soldiers only about 20 seconds to enter shelters or take cover, a period that the army considers “sufficient,” with these systems being ready within a few weeks or months.

As for the level of interception, the Israeli army is working on using “shotgun” rifles and 5.56 caliber fragmentation ammunition, in addition to “Iron Dome” systems, which have already begun shooting down a number of drones, in addition to other means that are still being tested.

In parallel, the report revealed that the Israeli army began deploying “hundreds of thousands of meters” of protective nets over military sites and fortifications, in a step described inside Israel as coming in a “rapid and panicky” manner due to the escalation of losses.

The report indicates that fear within the army is not limited to southern Lebanon only, but extends to the possibility of these drones moving to the West Bank and Gaza and even deep into Israel, with expectations that in the future they will turn into swarms containing between 10 and 20 drones or more in a single attack.

The report acknowledges that Israel saw the use of this type of drone during the Ukrainian war three years ago, but “did not realize the extent of the threat,” because these drones seemed small, simple, and ineffective compared to missiles and warplanes.

In a remarkable step, the report revealed direct cooperation between the Israeli army and Ukrainian experts to develop anti-drone solutions, within a team formed by the Commander of the Ground Forces, Major General Nadav Lotan, and which includes former Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainian language speakers.

The report confirms that the “Close-to-Ground Combat Department” in the Israeli army is working around the clock to develop a package of solutions to confront this threat, but the most prominent recognition remains that the bomb-laden drones have so far succeeded in imposing a new equation of attrition on the Israeli army in southern Lebanon.

At the conclusion of the report, the Israeli writer acknowledges the extent of the impasse, saying that most of what Israeli soldiers do today in southern Lebanon is “escaping from the marches,” wondering whether the cost of remaining there has become higher than the military gains themselves, in a question that reflects the extent of Israeli anxiety about a war whose rules are rapidly changing.