“Lebanon Debate”
Amid the Israeli escalation in the south, and the increasing overlap between the field and politics, attention is turning to the nature of the next stage, amid mounting questions about the possibilities of military expansion, especially against the backdrop of the Israeli statements yesterday, or the possibility of reaching regional understandings that will reflect on Lebanon.
In this context, retired pilot Brigadier General Andre Abu Maasher, in an interview with Lebanon Debate, provides a strategic reading of the southern scene, based on military data, regional connections, and internal balances.
The level of precision was not achieved
Brigadier General Abu Maasher believes that, from a military perspective, it is inaccurate to talk about complete Israeli control or a final and stable defensive reality in the south, explaining that the military concept of control does not mean merely reaching certain points or carrying out fire operations, but rather assumes a sustainable positioning, closing gaps, freedom of movement, and effective monitoring of the operational area.
He points out that this level of tightness has not yet been fully achieved, as there are still gaps that prevent the current Israeli line from being considered a tight and final defensive line.
On the other hand, he points out the need to distinguish between the various sectors of the south, explaining that the most sensitive area for Israel is not the south as a whole, but rather the sector located north-northeast of the bend of the Litani River, due to its relative proximity to some border settlements and the direct threat it represents, especially in terms of anti-armor missiles or nearby fire.
Abu Maasher believes that the Israeli pressure on this sector is understood within the logic of neutralizing the immediate threat rather than as a comprehensive, long-term occupation project.
The possibility clearly exists
Regarding the possibility of expansion or escalation before any negotiations, he confirms that the possibility clearly exists, because the current scene is governed by a race between two opposite paths: a path of calm imposed by the possibilities of regional understandings, and a path of escalation imposed by field calculations and attempts to improve conditions.
He adds that if Israel feels that the continuation of effective operations against it requires restoring deterrence or improving its negotiating position, it may resort to raising the ceiling of escalation or expanding military pressure. However, any additional expansion does not necessarily mean an intention for a broad occupation, but rather it may be part of the pressure to improve the position before the understandings are reached.
Reflection of American-Iranian progress
Regarding the possibility of any American-Iranian progress being reflected in Lebanon, Abu Muasher believes that this is likely, explaining that any serious path towards a broader American-Iranian understanding, or something resembling a grand deal that includes the gradual reintegration of Iran into the global economy, cannot remain separate from Iran’s regional role.
He explains that engagement in the global economy and broad international cooperation assumes a gradual transition from the logic of managing conflicts by proxy to a more pragmatic logic based on regional stability, noting that it is difficult to imagine Iran being economically and politically involved in a path of global cooperation, while arenas such as Lebanon remain open to continued confrontation. Therefore, any real shift in the nature of the US-Iranian relationship is likely to be reflected in the Lebanese arena.
The most complex problems
As for the possibility of Israel’s withdrawal from the south without disarming Hezbollah, Abu Muasher describes the issue as one of the most complex problems, noting that everyone is faced with the dilemma of mutual red lines.
He explains that the Israeli red line is based on the principle: “No complete withdrawal and no cessation of operations as long as Hezbollah’s weapons remain outside the control of the state,” while Hezbollah’s red line is: “Not handing over weapons as long as there is continued Israeli occupation and attacks.”
He believes that the essence of the crisis lies in the fact that each party links its step to the step of the other party. Israel wants security first, while Hezbollah wants to withdraw first, pointing out that this type of dilemma cannot be solved by victory or slogans, but only through a negotiating arrangement based on synchronization and coherence in implementation, which includes a gradual withdrawal, an actual cessation of attacks, guarantees, the spread of the state, and the beginning of the process of arms exclusivity within a Lebanese sovereign framework.
He stresses that any solution outside this logic will collide with the wall of collapse.
An unlikely scenario
Regarding the possibility of a confrontation between the Lebanese army and Hezbollah if disarmament is imposed by force, Abu Muasher believes that this scenario is unlikely, not because the problem does not exist, but rather because a decision of this magnitude requires a clear central political decision from the Lebanese authority, and the current Lebanese political environment does not seem ready to bear the consequences of a step of this kind.
He warns that any attempt to impose disarmament by force internally carries the risk of a widespread internal explosion, which makes this scenario, in the foreseeable future, unlikely. It is likely that any serious path, if it occurs, will be political, negotiated, and gradual, and linked to broader understandings, and not to a direct confrontation between the army and the party.
Abu Maasher concludes that the current scene is not between war and peace, but rather between fragile discipline and possible escalation, considering that the fundamental problem does not lie only in the field arrangements, but rather in the fact that all parties are still dealing with the crisis from the angle of managing pressure, not from the angle of addressing the roots of the conflict.
He concludes by asking whether the region is at the beginning of a solution, or just a temporary management of the crisis waiting for the next round?
