Samar dies
In his last speech, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem came out with an escalatory ceiling towards the government, threatening to turn the tables on it and bring it down on the street, in a move that brought back to the fore a number of legitimate questions about the party’s actual function and whether its role is limited to confronting Israel, or is it working to undermine any internal attempt to rebuild the Lebanese state and restore its institutions?
In this context, informed sources confirm to “Lebanon Debate” that Naim Qassem’s words are “more Iranian than Lebanese,” considering that their timing and content are directly related to the recent contact with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, and the accompanying messages related to the course of the Iranian-American negotiation. The sources describe the next stage as “extremely sensitive and difficult,” without hiding the extent of the fear that the party is experiencing, whether as a result of increasing external pressure on its weapons or because of the change in the internal Lebanese mood regarding its role and weapons.
In a broader reading of the scene, former Minister Rashid Derbas saw that the recent speech of Hezbollah Secretary General Sheikh Naim Qassem was characterized by a “hasty and proactive” nature, considering that it is based on a possible settlement between Iran and the United States, the features of which have not yet crystallized, or at least have not yet become clear and detailed, but rather are “tinged with great ambiguity.”
Communication…an escalatory speech
In an interview with Lebanon Debate, Derbas indicated that the phone call that took place between Sheikh Naim Qassem and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi may have been among the factors that prompted the party to adopt this escalatory rhetoric, especially after Araghchi stressed, according to what was reported, “Iran’s insistence on including Lebanon within the settlement paths.” However, Derbas considered that what was not taken into consideration is that any agreement of this kind might practically give Israel the right to “preemptive repression,” explaining that “if Israel suspects, for example, that a Hezbollah member has acquired a weapon, it can bomb the place where he is located, wherever it is.” He added that what is most dangerous, in his opinion, is that Israel in this case “is acting under the umbrella of the Iranian-American agreement,” which means that Iran has permitted Israel to exercise this right, “which is something that no Lebanese would permit.”
It has been dispersed since the assassination of Nasrallah
Regarding the reasons that push Hezbollah to raise the ceiling on its rhetoric from time to time, and whether it is able to bear the consequences of any internal disturbances or potential chaos, Derbas considered that “the party has been experiencing a state of political fragmentation since the assassination of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah,” saying that “Hezbollah’s discourse is no longer single, and no longer has fixed connotations that can be built upon, because it has begun to express multiple trends within the party.” He added that the party is directly affected by the current developments between Iran and the United States, which puts it in a state of anxiety and anticipation, unable to anticipate the final results of any potential agreements or know what the fate of Lebanon and the future relationship between it and Israel will be. He believed that this scene reflects “anxiety tinged with a kind of fear,” considering that the prevailing ambiguity “does not suggest stability at all.”
No, “May 7 is new”
When asked about the possibility of repeating the “May 7” scene in Lebanon, Derbas stressed that “a new May 7 will not happen,” but rather “May 7 is my words.” As for the continued influence of the “statelet” over the Lebanese state, Derbas considered that the state “has emerged from the control of the statelet since the election of the President of the Republic and the formation of the government.” He explained that the election of the President of the Republic came “on the ruins of the events of 2024, while the Prime Minister “was appointed from outside the will of Hezbollah,” noting that the party did not name anyone to assume the presidency of the government, but rather had “concerns and apprehensions” regarding this path.
Derbas concluded by suggesting a degree of optimism about the next stage, by talking about a path that has begun to gradually move away from the logic of a statelet, which may open the door to rebuilding the Lebanese state, even if the path to reaching it is arduous and difficult.
