Hussein Zalgout – Major General
Attention is once again turning to the south in light of a remarkable escalation in the pace of Israeli attacks, which are no longer limited to the intensification of raids in the south, but rather went beyond yesterday to explicitly hinting at the possibility of carrying out assassination operations targeting Hezbollah officials, even inside the capital, Beirut. This shift in Israeli rhetoric and behavior reflects a clear attempt to redraw the rules of engagement and impose a new deterrence equation based on moving the confrontation from the peripheries to the depth, with the risks that this carries of a comprehensive breakdown of the military situation.
This escalation does not appear to be separate from a broader context in the region. The tension between the United States and Iran is rearing its head again, amid indications that it may slide toward a second open confrontation, or at least into intermittent rounds of escalation in which regional arenas are used as mutual pressure cards. Thus, Lebanon becomes more than just a border front, but rather an advanced arena in the influence struggle, where military messages are mixed with political calculations.
Israel, which sees Hezbollah as the only threat on its northern front, seeks to undermine its capabilities by targeting what it considers “centers of gravity” within its organizational structure, and from here comes the threat of assassinating prominent officials, in an attempt to strike the decision-making and control system and confuse the resistance environment. However, this option entails high risks, because it touches red lines that have been avoided for years, especially when it comes to targeting figures inside Beirut.
On the other hand, Hezbollah realizes that any radical change in the rules of engagement will expose it to a difficult test. On the one hand, he cannot accept the invasion of the Lebanese depth, and on the other hand, he balances the necessity of responding, preserving the ceiling of the supposed truce, and preventing sliding into a comprehensive war. This delicate equation may become more fragile if Israel actually carries out specific assassinations, which may push the resistance to responses that go beyond the traditional framework of confrontation.
The current field scene also reflects this escalating tension, as Israeli air strikes are no longer limited to a narrow geographical scope, but rather extend to wider areas, while Hezbollah has intensified the use of new drones that have confused Israel, in an attempt to impose a new balance of deterrence. Between this and that, the front seems to be living in a state of “war under control,” where the red lines are being tested gradually, without reaching the big explosion that has not yet fallen out of the calculations.
However, what raises concern among political sources is that this type of confrontation may spiral out of control due to a miscalculation or a sudden decision by one of the parties. Previous experiences show that gradual escalation may quickly turn into open confrontation, especially when local factors intersect with regional tensions. If a confrontation breaks out between Washington and Tehran, all fronts associated with them, including Lebanon, will be vulnerable to flames.
In the opinion of the sources, this reality exacerbates the fragility of the Lebanese internal situation. The country, which is suffering from an unprecedented economic crisis and sharp political division, finds itself once again facing the danger of the return of war under its actual names, without having the tools to influence the decision of peace and war. This puts the state in front of a major challenge, which is how to protect internal stability in light of regional tensions and a limited ability to control the security rhythm.
The sources express their belief that Israel, for its part, may be betting that escalating military pressures could weaken its opponent or push him to make concessions, but at the same time it realizes that any uncalculated escalation may have a costly repercussion on it, whether on the security or economic levels. The war with Lebanon, if it breaks out again on a large scale, will not be similar to previous rounds, but may take on a more comprehensive nature, with the scope of targeting on both sides expanding.
As for Hezbollah, it is trying to manage the conflict according to precise rules, based on a measured response and avoiding being drawn into a wide-scale war except when absolutely necessary. However, this approach may become more complicated if the existing balance is broken, especially through assassination operations in sensitive areas such as the capital.
The sources conclude by saying: Israeli threats are no longer mere messages of pressure, but rather reflect a trend towards testing new limits of confrontation, and thus the reality of war remains open to all possibilities.
