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A recent analytical study, published on several American websites, showed that the policy recently followed by the United States and Israel, known as “beheadings,” is no longer considered an effective means of managing conflicts, but rather has become a factor that complicates matters and prolongs clashes instead of ending them.
The study, which examines the Iran and Hezbollah models, suggests that this strategy, which focuses on targeting leaders, may be successful in systems that rely on a single individual, but is counterproductive in systems that are based on cohesive institutional structures.
In this context, what was revealed in the report of journalist Barak Ravid on the “Axios” website, about Donald Trump granting Iran a period of only 3 to 5 days to extend the ceasefire and provide a unified response, stands out as a clear example of the current impasse. The problem is no longer limited to political will, but rather extends to the absence of a single party capable of making decisions within Tehran.
The study shows that the American bet was based on the assumption that assassinating leaders would lead to confusion and perhaps collapse of the opponent. However, this assumption contradicts the nature of regimes like Iran, which are run not as a “dictatorship of an individual,” but rather as an “institutional dictatorship,” where power is distributed among multiple agencies that ensure the continuity of the regime even in the absence of its leader.
As the study shows, this reality leads to a two-fold result: the system does not collapse, but it becomes more complex. There are multiple decision centers and overlapping calculations, making negotiation more difficult and a decisive solution less likely.
The same scene is repeated in Lebanon. Although prominent Hezbollah leaders were targeted, the organization did not disintegrate, but rather continued to operate thanks to its institutional structure. However, according to the study, this model creates new internal dynamics, as some wings may move independently, imposing a field rhythm that goes beyond the central political decision.
The study concludes that the “decapitation” policy leads to three main results in this type of system: maintaining the organizational structure, dispersing the decision-making process, and complicating any negotiating path.
Thus, Washington finds itself facing a clear paradox: it has not weakened its opponents as expected, but rather faces entities that are more resilient to survival, but less amenable to control or containment.