– Political editor
The events that followed Lebanon’s entry into the ceasefire phase, according to the US State Department memorandum, reveal a clear Israeli tendency to maintain the military status quo established by this memorandum, and even employ it to serve its old, renewed project in Lebanon. What is more dangerous than what becomes clear daily in the south is that the ceasefire agreement circulating, whether in its presented form or as stated in the US State Department memorandum after the first Washington meeting, includes provisions that are extremely dangerous for Lebanon. The strategic expert, retired Brigadier General Naji Malaeb, focuses on Article Three of this agreement, which is “very clear,” as it stipulates that Israel reserves the right to act by all means to confront what it considers imminent or imminent dangers, or even just plan for potential threats, which practically gives Israel cover to move militarily, including targeting and destroying any house suspected of having weapons in it, which puts Lebanon, if it signs the agreement, in a position of being unable to object to such operations, which is It directly affects his sovereignty.
But what Brigadier General Malaeb L. reveals goes beyond the terms of the agreement and reaches what Israel is implementing on the ground, specifically in the town of Ain Atta, where Malaeb points to a dangerous field development that was monitored two days ago, based on the testimonies of eyewitnesses in the town, when Israeli forces entered the town and established a military point that marked the so-called “end of the yellow line.” What is interesting, according to Malaeb, is that this point was named with a Hebrew expression instead of using the name of the town, which raises fears of Israel’s intention to establish a permanent presence in these areas.
He adds that the use of Hebrew designations within what is known as the Yellow Line may indicate an Israeli tendency to impose a new reality on the ground, by considering these points as part of its sphere of influence, which may subsequently make it difficult for any withdrawal or retreat from them.
On the military level, Brigadier General Malaeb warns that the strategy adopted by Hezbollah, which is to allow Israeli forces to advance and then target them through ambushes, in what is known as “flexible defence,” carries great risks. According to his assessment, when the Israeli army advances to a certain point, it does not retreat from it, but rather seeks to establish its presence by establishing permanent sites, military centers, and observatories. Here, Malaeb confirms that the current ceasefire period is being exploited by Israel to strengthen this concentration, in parallel with preventing people from returning to their villages, and beginning systematic destruction and bulldozing operations to remove the features of these villages, which has led to the perpetuation of the existing field reality.
Concerning what is said about what is happening in the south being managed from abroad, Malaeb believes that what is happening in Pakistan, whether negative or positive, has indirect repercussions on Lebanon. Despite the Lebanese state’s assertion that the decision to negotiate is independent and not in the hands of Iran, he points out that any potential agreement between the United States and Iran, as US President Donald Trump wishes, is still stuck on sensitive items, including Iranian demands related to obtaining international guarantees that it will not be attacked.
Among these demands is the issuance of a statement by the UN Security Council guaranteeing that it will not attack Tehran, unless it is the aggressor, in addition to explicit pledges not to target it by the United States or Israel. Malaeb believes that if Iran succeeds in imposing such conditions, it will not be difficult for it to demand a permanent ceasefire in Lebanon, especially in light of the “effectiveness” of the role of its allies in supporting it regionally, whether in Iraq or Lebanon, with the continued Houthi threats to use additional pressure cards. Such as the possibility of closing the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Malaeb adds that one of the Houthi leaders recently stated that closing this strait would prevent any party from reopening it, which reflects the extent of the complexity in the regional scene. Accordingly, Malaeb believes that the success of the negotiating path will lead Iran to consolidate its influence and protect its allies, while the failure of these negotiations, or their exposure again to new attacks by the United States or Israel, will lead to an Iranian response in which Hezbollah may participate directly.
However, Malaeb finds that the parties involved in the Pakistan negotiations, despite sitting at the dialogue table, are still preparing for a war scenario, in light of their conviction that this round is only a stage in a long conflict. US President Donald Trump is seeking to end the fighting and present this as an achievement, but he faces difficulty in achieving a clear victory and returning to the Americans by only completing the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, especially in light of the complexities surrounding this file, which leaves the scene open to multiple possibilities in the next stage.
