– Muhammad Al-Madani
The problem is no longer limited to the government’s current performance, but rather goes beyond that to include a fundamental deficiency in some Sunni ministers’ understanding of their role within this government. They seem to view the ministry as merely an administrative position, in which their work is limited to managing people’s affairs to a limited extent.
The Ministry of Economy manages the numbers without having any tangible impact on the ground. The Ministry of Education is limited to regulating the work of schools. The Ministry of Social Affairs deals with social files, but this does not reflect positively on the lives of people, especially the poor. Even the Ministry of Interior, the performance of its minister is still confined to a narrow security framework.
This perception, which is embraced by all Sunni ministers in President Nawaf Salam’s government, strips the ministerial position of its political importance and turns it into a mere technical administration that does not have the ability to influence decision-making.
In the Lebanese system, where sectarian balances are not a secondary matter but rather the basis on which the distribution of power is based, the ministerial role cannot be reduced in this way. The minister is not just an employee, but rather a political representative and a real partner in decision-making. When this awareness is absent, the balance is disturbed, and the sect it represents loses its actual presence within the executive authority.
This imbalance was directly reflected in the website of the Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam. His current weakness is not only due to external pressures, but also to the absence of Sunni political support within his government. When ministers turn into mere administrators, the prime minister becomes exposed, without political depth, and without a team capable of confronting or even defending his positions.
But the problem does not stop there. President Salam deals with his position from a “general national” angle that goes beyond sectarian affiliations. This is a correct proposal in principle, but it is insufficient in the Lebanese reality. The presidency of the government, due to the existing balances, requires conscious management of the relationship with the Sunni political and parliamentary environment, and not leaving it in a state of vacuum or political apathy.
The imbalance is clearly evident in the relationship with Sunni representatives. There is an absence of effective communication, weakness in initiatives, and coldness in building a political support network. Evidence of this is the modest presence of these representatives at important stations, which reflects a political interruption whose seriousness cannot be underestimated.
The result today is clear and disturbing: a prime minister who lacks sufficient political cover, ministers who do not play an effective political role, and a Sunni environment that feels marginalized and outside the decision-making equation. This is not just a passing detail, but rather a structural flaw that threatens the position of prime minister and disrupts the national balance.
What is required is no longer just a political luxury, but rather an urgent necessity: the role of the minister must be redefined as a political actor and not as an administrative manager. The relationship between the Prime Minister and the Sunni representatives must be rebuilt on clear political foundations that restore balance and prevent a vacuum. Because continuing this approach not only weakens the government, but also weakens the Sunni community’s position in the political system, and opens the door to a broader imbalance in Lebanon’s balances.
