– Muhammad Al-Madani
Lebanon today is not just facing a crisis that can be resolved with a political statement or a temporary agreement, but rather it is facing a deep problem that touches the core of the state: Who makes the decision? Who has the upper hand? The state that participates in the negotiations must be the one with the authority, but the reality shows a different picture, as this authority is distributed between the official institutions on the one hand, and the de facto forces on the other hand, which makes any political commitment fragile and subject to change at any moment.
The problem is no longer just the presence of weapons, but rather who controls its use. When there is an entity capable of disrupting the political process by withdrawing support, while at the same time keeping the military front burning, the state finds itself in an impossible situation: negotiating without guarantees and unenforceable commitments. This is not just a political crisis, but a direct blow to Lebanon’s credibility internally and externally, because trust is not based on intentions, but on the actual ability to implement decisions.
What we are witnessing today goes beyond the usual duplication to a state of disintegration in the decision-making centre. The state says one thing, and the reality on the ground says another. The government bears the responsibility for negotiation, but it does not have the necessary tools. Institutions ostensibly represent legitimacy, while actual decisions are made outside them. Here, we are not talking about a defect in performance, but rather about a full-fledged crisis of sovereignty, which threatens to empty the state of its content and turn it into a mere administrative apparatus without real authority.
But realism requires staying away from emotional reactions. Dealing with Hezbollah cannot be through exclusion or direct confrontation, because we are facing a complex structure in which the military, social, and regional dimensions overlap. Any attempt to violently break this structure would destroy the state itself before affecting Hezbollah, making a purely security option a surefire recipe for chaos.
From here, the real question becomes: How do we end the state of obstruction without causing internal chaos? The answer lies in a gradual path that rebuilds the state from within the existing balances, and not by going beyond them. Integrating Hezbollah into the logic of the state is not just a political slogan, but rather a delicate process that requires rebuilding confidence within its environment, and confirming that this path is not targeting it, but rather reorganizing the relationship between the state and its components. On the other hand, a basic and indisputable principle must be established: no decisions outside the institutions, and no legitimacy for any role beyond them.
However, this internal path, no matter how coherent it is, will not succeed if it remains disconnected from the regional context. Lebanon is not a political island, and its decisions are directly affected by broader balances, especially the relationship with Tehran. Therefore, any serious solution must pass through regional intersections that place Lebanon within a broader settlement, and not as an open arena for conflicts.
Ignoring this fact or trying to ignore it will only exacerbate the crisis. We will remain faced with a state that negotiates without authority, a reality that imposes itself without legitimacy, and institutions that manage the vacuum instead of filling it. Then, the challenge will not be to reform the system, but to prevent its complete collapse.
Lebanon today faces a clear choice that cannot be interpreted: either to continue managing this deadly contradiction between a state that negotiates and a reality that decides, or to enter a long and difficult path to reunite the sovereign decision. This path will not be easy, nor will it be quick, but it is the only option capable of returning meaning to the state, feasibility to negotiation, and hope to a country that has been stuck for years in a cycle of continuous obstruction.
