At a time when Israel views itself as the most attractive partner in the region due to its military strength and the presence of common opponents, a completely different Saudi reading emerges, which considers that this perception is no longer sufficient to understand the ongoing transformations in the Middle East, and that a new regional security structure is being formed without Israel necessarily being at its center.
According to an opinion article by Saudi researcher Dr. Abdulaziz Al-Ghasyan, a specialist in Saudi foreign policy towards Israel, published on the Israeli “N12” website, the signing of the joint defense agreement in Mecca between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan aroused widespread interest in Israel, where the discussion focused mainly on one question: Is this new alliance directed against Israel?
Al-Ghasyan believes that this question itself reflects the traditional Israeli way of thinking, as Israel has for years used to explain regional cooperation through the concept of a “common enemy.”
According to this view, the “Abraham Accords” were also interpreted on the basis that the Iranian threat is the factor that brings Israel together with the Arab countries, and makes a strong Israel an indispensable partner.
However, Al-Ghasian believes that the Israeli tendency to interpret the “Mecca Agreement” by asking whether it is pro-Israel or directed against it reveals a deeper problem in Israeli political and social discourse.
In his opinion, any attempt to understand the region’s dynamics by dividing it bilaterally into camps formed on the basis of common enemies is a misreading and limited.
He points out that this perception does not reflect the way Saudi Arabia and other regional players view security.
Even during the contacts that were ongoing regarding possible normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia before October 7, Riyadh had restored its relations with Iran, as did the United Arab Emirates, without the two countries considering that there was a contradiction between the two paths.
From this standpoint, Al-Ghasyan believes that the Middle East is going through a broad restructuring phase, and that Israel is not necessarily at the center of the new regional order that is gradually being formed.
The Saudi researcher acknowledges that Iran poses a real threat to the region, noting that, since February, the Iranians have launched missiles and drones toward the Gulf states in larger numbers than those launched toward Israel.
But the existence of a common threat, according to Al-Ghasyan, does not necessarily mean the existence of a common strategy to confront it.
From the Gulf perspective, one of the most prominent lessons learned from the recent war is the danger of uncontrolled regional escalation for countries that find themselves involved in conflicts in which they did not originally seek to participate.
Al-Ghasyan believes that Saudi Arabia’s primary interest is to ensure stability and the ability to anticipate developments, strengthen regional defense capabilities, and establish additional security frameworks.
These frameworks, according to his vision, are not required to replace the security structure led by the United States, but rather to work alongside and complement it.
According to Al-Ghasyan, the “Mecca Agreement” comes as an expression of a region seeking to assume greater responsibility for protecting its security.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan do not agree on everything, but what matters to them is the ability to manage security challenges, enhance deterrence, and establish forms of cooperation despite the existing differences between them.
The researcher believes that Israel could have a place within such a structure as well.
In his opinion, the Israelis are well aware of their interest in integrating within a regional security framework, but they often insist on completely separating this goal from the discussion regarding Israeli policy in Gaza, the West Bank and other arenas.
From the Saudi point of view, according to Al-Ghasyan, this contradiction becomes more difficult to ignore with the passage of time.
The researcher goes so far as to say that Israel could have been automatically viewed as a fundamental pillar in a regional security structure, but the current Israeli government policy turns it, in his view, into “a pillar in a structure of insecurity.”
Al-Ghasyan stresses that this path is not inevitable, pointing out that Saudi Arabia and other regional players have previously proven that Israel can be a strategic partner, but this remains linked to the policy it adopts.
He clarifies that this does not mean that Saudi Arabia considers Israel and Iran equal threats, nor that the entire region is moving against Israel.
But the real significance, in his view, is more troubling for Israelis, as Israeli military strength, which many inside Israel assume makes their country an attractive partner, is now seen in parts of the region as a source of uncertainty and risk.
Al-Ghasyan believes that the results of the war with Iran clearly reveal this gap in outlook.
While parts of the Israeli discourse viewed Iranian behavior as evidence that Israel and the Arab countries are natural allies, the Gulf states came to a different conclusion.
According to this reading, the question is no longer limited to identifying the common enemy, but rather related to how to deal with him, control escalation, and maintain stability.
Al-Ghasyan stresses that this distinction is essential, as deterrence can be built by military force, but building partnerships requires different elements, including reliability, self-control, and the presence of a common vision not only for the regional system, but also for the way it should be built.
Hence, it is considered that the question that should concern Israelis is not whether the “Mecca Agreement” is directed against Israel, but rather why Israel finds itself, at a moment when the region is working to build new security mechanisms, increasingly outside the discussion.
Al-Ghasyan answers that if Israel wants to integrate into the security structure currently taking shape in the Middle East, it must prove that it is capable of being more than just a strong partner.
In his opinion, Israel is required to be a reliable and predictable partner, able to exercise restraint and invest in diplomacy, and not expect uncertainty and fear to replace trust.
Accordingly, in this reading, the “Mecca Agreement” does not appear to be a declaration of alignment against Israel as much as it reflects a broader shift in the concept of regional security, where force alone is no longer sufficient to reserve a seat at the table, while stability, reliability, and control of escalation become decisive elements in determining who enters the new structure and who remains outside it.
