Andre Kassas
It is not easy to put leader Walid Jumblatt in one box when it comes to the Lebanese-Israeli “framework agreement.” According to his declared positions, he does not present himself as part of a political front to drop the agreement, but rather says that he is ready to help the state if it wants to reconsider it. But on the other hand, he raises his level of objection to the point of describing the agreement as “unilaterally dictated by Israel,” considering that it does not guarantee a ceasefire and does not impose a clear Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory.
Therefore, Jumblatt recalled the 1949 Armistice Agreement, considering its absence from the “Framework Agreement” to be remarkable, while he believes that it constitutes a clearer legal reference for the relationship between Lebanon and Israel.
The most sensitive issue in Jumblatt’s reading of this agreement is linking the Israeli withdrawal to the extent of the Lebanese state’s success in dealing with the illegal weapons issue.
Here Jumblatt feels that the equation is being reversed. Instead of the occupation being the problem that should be ended first, Hezbollah’s weapons become the input that determines the timing of Israeli withdrawal. This, in his view, means moving the center of the problem from the border to the Lebanese interior.
If the state does not succeed in implementing what is required of it security-wise, Israel can, according to this reading, say that the conditions for withdrawal have not yet been met. Thus, the occupation becomes a pressure card on the Lebanese state, instead of a violation that is supposed to end according to the terms of reference of international law.
It may seem at first glance that Jumblatt, Hezbollah, and President Nabih Berri are standing in the same trench in confronting the “Framework Agreement.” But this similarity does not mean identical motives.
Hezbollah basically refuses to link the Israeli withdrawal to its disarmament, while Berri described the agreement as a dictate and refused to pass it in its current form. As for Jumblatt, he places his objection within a broader heading: Lebanese sovereignty, the authority of international law, and the nature of the future relationship between Lebanon and Israel.
The clearest evidence is that Jumblatt himself did not announce his joining a coalition to drop the agreement, but rather said that he was ready to help the state if it decided to reconsider it. In other words, he wants to change the course, not necessarily destroy the course. Perhaps here lies the most dangerous point in Jumblatt’s position.
He believes that the agreement is not limited to regulating the military relationship on the borders, but rather, in one way or another, it enters into details related to the balance of power within Lebanon.
If the Israeli withdrawal becomes linked to the disarmament of “Hezbollah” and the extent of the state’s ability to impose arms exclusivity, then negotiations with Israel will inevitably turn into a factor of pressure on Lebanese internal balances. This would place the state before a very complex equation: either it implements the required conditions internally, or the Israeli occupation remains in place. From here, we can understand Jumblatt’s insistence on reconsidering the agreement, instead of treating it as a fait accompli that cannot be modified.
On the other hand, Jumblatt also does not hide his concern about the size of the American role in the agreement and the mechanism for its implementation. If Washington is the sponsor, mediator, guarantor, and supervisor of implementation at the same time, the question that arises is: Where is the space for independent Lebanese decision-making? Here Jumblatt’s historical concern returns, as he does not want Lebanon to move from one guardianship to another, and from one external decision to another external decision.
For him, sovereignty does not only mean removing Israeli forces from Lebanese territory, but it also means that the state is able to make its decisions without aid, reconstruction, or the security file turning into tools of pressure on it.
Why is the truce agreement important to Jumblatt? Because, according to his vision, he places the Lebanese-Israeli relationship within a clear international framework, while Jumblatt fears that the “framework agreement” will lead to the creation of a new system that makes Israeli withdrawal conditional on a set of Lebanese commitments. Therefore, it seems that he wants to reinstall the following equation: Lebanon is committed to what it has to do, but Israel must also adhere to what it has to do. The Lebanese commitments should not be immediate and measurable, while the Israeli withdrawal remains postponed and conditional.
Jumblatt, who was and still is one of the most ardent opponents to the decision on war and peace being made outside the state, does not, in return, want the state to take back its decision from within in order to hand it over, in negotiations, to the outside.
Hence, it seems that his main battle is not with the “Framework Agreement” as a title, but rather with the philosophy on which this agreement can be based.
