The Israeli response may be a Lebanese exit?

In the current Lebanese and regional political scene, the recent American proposals appear to constitute a possible turning point in the course of the crisis. According to what is repeated in the scenes, the Israeli response, which is expected to be negative on these proposals, will have a direct impact on the Lebanese interior, specifically on the relationship between the “Shiite duo” and the Baabda Palace.
In Baabda, this response is read as a clear entrance towards an attempt to calm the existing tension, or at least freezing it in phased, pending what the negotiations and unannounced understandings will lead to. From here, it can be said that the presidency of the Republic adopts its accounts on the hypothesis that the government’s decisions will not be decided until after the approval of Israel, which reflects the depth of intertwining between internal factors and external pressures. On the other hand, there is another scene that imposes itself on the Israeli account table. The indicators indicate that Tel Aviv is seriously preparing for the swamp of Gaza, a battle that may turn into a long -term depletion, making the Israeli leadership more cautious in its approach to the Lebanese front. Any wrong step may be opened to a parallel war in the north, which does not seem that Israel is ready for it at this stage. Nevertheless, the hypothesis of the military strike remains. The most circulating scenario is that Tel Aviv has done a qualitative process against Hezbollah, targeting its administrative and organizational institutions, not civilians, in an attempt to send a strong message without pushing the party to a comprehensive response. However, this option, despite its potential accuracy, will not constitute a true way out of the crisis, but may increase it complicated and everyone enters into a new balance game that has no actual solutions. So, the next stage is a candidate to witness a dual path: on the one hand, indirect communication between the party and the Lebanese state, its goal is to control the rhythm of tension and avoid actual collision, and on the other hand the survival of the doors is in front of any settlement Root. The current balance, based on the freezing of decisions and waiting for external positions, may prolong the life of the crisis instead of ending them. The clear result is that Lebanon will remain stuck between Washington and Tel Aviv accounts on the one hand, and the estimates of the party and the presidency of the Republic on the other. There is no comprehensive explosion that appears imminent, and no decisive solutions waving on the horizon, but rather a management of the crisis, through mutual messages and repeated attempts to avoid the great slippage, which may print the Lebanese scene in the coming months.