“Lebanon Debate” – Political Editor
The idea coming from Paris to deploy a joint Italian-French force in the south as the end of the UNIFIL mandate approaches at the end of this year, moves the international presence from one stage to another, especially since the transition to a new international scene is inevitably going through a transitional period undertaken by the United States, which is sponsoring the framework understanding between Lebanon and Israel and is preparing to implement it practically in the coming days.
While international discussions intensify about the future of the international presence in the south and the mechanism for keeping up with the implementation of international resolutions, the legal advisor to the European Commission, Dr. Mohieddin Shehimi, reveals that the proposals circulating today are not new, but rather go back to the stage of the recent renewal of UNIFIL’s mandate in the Security Council, where international disagreements emerged, which prevented the resolution from being passed smoothly, opening the door to research into alternatives or new formulas for the international presence in the south.
Dr. Shehimi confirmed to Lebanon Debate that Paris proposed deploying a European force in the south last year, when the decision to extend UNIFIL faced obstacles and difficulties imposed by Washington, which led to the end of UNIFIL’s mandate in its current form after expanding its powers during its last year.
It is known that the implementation of international resolutions requires the continued presence of an international force in the south, given that UNIFIL’s primary mission is to maintain peace, monitor, prepare reports, and assist the Lebanese state in implementing Resolution 1701, according to what Shehimi explains, who points out that Lebanon has not shown sufficient commitment to implementing international resolutions during the past years.
At the same time, Shehimi does not hide that over the past years, UNIFIL has been the victim of opposing pressures, between Israel on the one hand, and Hezbollah on the other, which has limited its ability to perform its tasks as required.
Speaking about the reality of the South in the coming year 2027 and whether Paris will succeed in convincing President Donald Trump not to leave the South in a vacuum, Shehimi reveals three scenarios being discussed at the international level. The first is extending the current mandate of UNIFIL, which is a weak possibility but remains valid, especially if President Trump changes his position, in light of the unpredictability of his policies.
In this case, Shehimi believes that what is on the table behind the UN scenes is for UNIFIL to continue in the south until the end of the mission of the American mechanism to supervise the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, given that the essence of the solution is not linked to the presence of international forces per se, but rather to the American mechanism that leads the implementation of the framework agreement.
In Shehimi’s estimation, UNIFIL has today become an integral part of the solution path, not the main element in it, in light of an Arab and international consensus on the necessity of not emptying the south of the international presence, because this represents a guarantee to keep the region under international supervision, and prevent it from turning into an open arena for chaos, whether as a result of Israeli attacks or through Hezbollah’s movements. Shehimi finds that the two parties do not practically want the Lebanese state to extend its full authority over the south, which makes the continued international presence an international need to supervise the stage that precedes any final agreement that ends the state of war.
The second scenario calls for the formation of a new European international force that includes five or six European countries, but without French or Spanish leadership. Chehimi attributes this to the tension that has existed between France and Israel for about three years, and to the Israelis’ loss of confidence in the French role, as they consider that Paris is no longer a neutral mediator, especially after the Gaza War and the French-Saudi rapprochement regarding the “two-state solution.”
In this context, Shehimi explains that this force will be broader than UNIFIL in terms of powers and freedom of movement on the ground, with the possibility of expanding its scope of deployment to include areas outside the south of the Litani as a result of the expansion of the Israeli occupation, provided that it forms the basic foundation of what is known as “experimental areas,” with a direct link to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO, which may push the Trump administration to a relative acceptance of this scenario, given the close relationship between this force and the Atlantic Alliance, and thus his assessment that “he can control this force through NATO.”
The third scenario, as Shehimi continues, is the establishment of an international force that includes, in addition to the European forces, units from some Arab armies, without the identity of the participating Arab countries having been decided yet, provided that this force is also in direct coordination with NATO forces, within the framework of a new international formula for managing the next phase in southern Lebanon.
