“Lebanon Debate”
There is no longer much room for confusion or contradictory interpretations. The available political and field data confirm that Lebanon is outside the Iranian-American agreement, and that the Lebanese file does not constitute an item within the understandings being negotiated between Washington and Tehran.
If some in Lebanon were betting that any agreement between the two parties would be automatically reflected in the Lebanese arena, the facts on the ground undermined this belief. The recent Israeli raid on the southern suburb, hours before the signing of the agreement, came as a direct message confirming that the rules of engagement in Lebanon have not changed, and that any regional understanding has not yet imposed a cessation of escalation or new equations on the Lebanese front.
According to follow-up sources, the US-Iranian negotiations are focused on files related to the Iranian nuclear program, sanctions, and broader regional arrangements, while the Lebanese file has been completely separated from this track.
The sources confirm that there will be no final cessation of the war in Lebanon, nor a complete Israeli withdrawal from the south, nor the establishment of stability, except through a special understanding for Lebanon that is negotiated through the channels run by Washington between the Lebanese state and Israel.
She adds that the American administration is now dealing with the Lebanese file as an independent paper with its basic keys, and is not prepared to link it to negotiations with Iran or give Tehran any decisive role in it. The international community is also showing increasing determination to prevent Lebanon from being returned to the Iranian sphere of influence that has ruled the scene over the past years.
On the other hand, according to the sources, Tehran is trying to suggest that Lebanon is present at the negotiating table and that any understanding with Washington will include the Lebanese arena, in an attempt to preserve its political and moral position within the environment that embraces Hezbollah.
The data reveal that Lebanon practically stands before two paths without a third to achieve its basic goals: stopping the war once and for all, ending the Israeli occupation of the points that are still occupied, restoring the prisoners, and opening the door to reconstruction.
The first track is the Iranian-American negotiation track. However, this path, despite the progress it has achieved between Washington and Tehran, has not yet been reflected in the Lebanese reality. Neither the war stopped, nor the occupation withdrew, nor did the prisoner file witness any actual breakthrough, which confirms that Lebanon is not part of the deal proposed between the two parties.
As for the second path, it is the path led directly by Washington between Lebanon and Israel, which today appears to be the only path capable of producing tangible results. The American administration is clearly betting on this path, and is treating it as an entry point to a broader security and political settlement in the south.
The American bet is not limited to establishing security stability only, but rather extends to an integrated project to re-introduce Lebanon to the regional economic map through investments, international aid, and reconstruction projects, which are elements that Washington considers an essential part of any future settlement.
Accordingly, the picture appears clearer than ever: the Iranian-American agreement may produce understandings related to Tehran and Washington, but it did not succeed in imposing peace on the Lebanese front. As for the future of the south, the Israeli withdrawal, the prisoner issue, and reconstruction, it is linked to the independent negotiating path led by the United States between Lebanon and Israel, not to the ongoing negotiations with Iran.
