“Lebanon Debate”
It seems that commemorating the martyr President Rashid Karami this year is not limited to recalling a national figure from a sentimental or patriotic standpoint, but rather has turned into a political station that carries within it messages that go beyond the limits of the occasion itself.
In Tripoli, many say that the real goal of the crowd is not the event itself, but rather sending political messages abroad, specifically to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, that Faisal Karami still has a popular base capable of influencing the Tripoli and Lebanese scene.
In this context, Tripoli political circles are talking about extensive organizational efforts preceding the event, while observers believe that the amount of media focus accompanying it reflects a clear desire to demonstrate political and popular capacity that can be employed in the next stage. During the past few days, information was circulated that those close to Karami tried to promote about the possibility of prominent Gulf diplomatic figures attending the occasion, but this information was not confirmed, while informed sources confirm that what is being circulated regarding the presence of the Saudi ambassador to Lebanon, Fahd Al-Dosari, is baseless.
Opposition circles to Karami say that recent weeks have witnessed intense political and organizational movements aimed at revitalizing his presence in Tripoli, in parallel with mobilizing his electoral machine and restoring communication with local activities and keys in preparation for the next stage.
In parallel, a new political behavior has emerged recently adopted by Karami, which is based on softening the rhetoric towards the “Lebanese Forces” and its leader, Samir Geagea, in a move that observers see as an attempt to open channels of communication with the forces that are believed to have the keys to crossing into a new political phase.
On the other hand, his recent appearances recorded more stringent positions towards Hezbollah, which some considered an additional indication of an attempt to reposition itself compatible with internal and regional changes.
It seems that Karami has become convinced that the road to the government palace does not only pass through Tripoli or through the traditional alliances he knew previously, but it also now passes through Maarab. Therefore, it seeks to re-present itself in a different way, less confrontational and more marketable to regional and international parties influencing the Lebanese file.
But the question that arises is: Is changing the political discourse and shifting positioning sufficient to convince the Lebanese of the existence of a new political project? Or is what is happening nothing more than an attempt to beautify a political image that has not changed in essence?
The problem for Faisal Karami is not his ability to change his rhetoric, but rather his ability to convince people that he has actually changed his political choices. Moving from one position to another, from rivalry to appeasement, and from one axis to another, may open new doors, but it does not erase the memory of the Tripolitans.
Today, it seems that Karami is betting that opening up to yesterday’s opponents and raising the ceiling of his rhetoric in new directions may open doors for him that were previously closed. However, the biggest stake remains in convincing the street that what is happening is not just a change in position imposed by political transformations, but rather a coherent and viable political project.
Therefore, the question remains: Is what is taking place a real repositioning, or just an attempt to search for a shortcut to the government palace that passes this time through Maarab and Riyadh?
