“Lebanon Debate”
The Israeli escalation in the south is increasing, reaching the southern suburbs, where the violation exceeds the limits of traditional security messages, raising broader questions about the nature of the next phase, and whether the region is actually entering a new phase of open but controlled rules of engagement. Between the continuation of Israeli strikes, the complexities associated with the US-Iranian negotiations, and the delicate balances that govern the regional scene, it seems that what is happening is no longer just a local escalation, but rather part of a broader strategic conflict in which the limits of deterrence and the management of influence in the region are being tested.
In this context, retired Brigadier General Bahaa Halal presents a reading of the current scene on three overlapping levels, not by describing the attack on the southern suburb last Wednesday as a local security incident or a separate scene only, but as part of a broader strategic path related to redrawing the rules of engagement in the region.
He believes, in an interview with “Lebanon Debate,” that the targeting in the southern suburb and then the bombing of Nabatieh, within the context of continued violations after the ceasefire, suggest that Israel is trying to reformulate the “deterrence architecture” more than it is trying to go towards a comprehensive war at the present time, indicating that there are several strategic possibilities moving in parallel.
He considers that Israel appears to have moved from the logic of “preventing the threat during the war” to the logic of “managing the security environment after the war,” that is, it is trying to impose a new equation that the ceasefire does not mean stopping the freedom of Israeli action. This is a very important shift, because the goal is no longer limited to striking military targets only, but rather goes beyond it to keep the environment of the south and the suburbs under constant pressure, prevent the development of the military structure technically, operationally, and organizationally, and create a feeling that the Lebanese air and security space is still open to Israel, in addition to turning the ceasefire into a truce. Watched by fire.
He adds that this approach is similar, to some extent, to what Israel did in Syria after 2013, when it did not want a comprehensive war, but sought to establish “the right to continue strike.” However, applying this model in Lebanon seems more complicated, given the difference in the deterrence environment and the high sensitivity of the Lebanese and regional interior.
Brigadier General Halal raises another possibility that he also considers strong, which is that the escalation is linked to the US-Iranian negotiations, explaining that when any negotiation channel advances between the United States and Iran, Israel usually fears any understandings that may reduce its military margin or lead to regional arrangements that do not fully take into account its security priorities. Hence, the recent strikes may serve as an indirect pressure message to Tehran, and a message to the Americans that Israel is capable of raising the field ceiling if it feels that the understandings exceed it.
But in return, he stresses a precise point, which is that the United States often seeks to “control escalation,” while Israel sometimes resorts to “limited escalation” with the aim of improving the conditions for regional negotiation. Here, according to his opinion, the American-Israeli discrepancy appears, explaining that the matter does not rise to the level of a direct conflict as much as it reflects a difference in the management of the Lebanese theater.
He explains that Washington wants to prevent a major collapse, protect relative stability, and keep the front under a controlled ceiling, while some Israeli decision-making circles seek to reshape the security and urban reality in the south, and perhaps create a human pressure zone that prevents the full natural return of some border areas. Therefore, the dispute, according to his assessment, does not revolve around the origin of the strategic goal, but rather around the limits of the force used to achieve it, and for this reason sometimes implicit American acceptance of some strikes appears, in exchange for a clear refusal to expand towards a comprehensive war or widespread destruction that may lead to a regional explosion.
Brigadier General Halal believes that the current stage appears to be an attempt to create hybrid rules of engagement based on Israel striking without going to a comprehensive war, while the resistance responds using direct or indirect methods, pointing out that the response may become a delayed calculation, or asymmetrical, or distributed over multiple arenas, and thus the region enters, according to his description, into a stage of “flexible deterrence” instead of the old traditional deterrence.
He adds that Israel is currently testing to what extent it can expand the strike margin without causing a comprehensive explosion, while the resistance is testing how to maintain deterrence without being drawn into a timing that it may not want at this stage.
As for the possibilities of response, he believes that it is linked to three basic factors, the first of which is the nature of the target and the losses, as specific targeting or the fall of leaders or civilians in large numbers automatically raises the possibility of a response, and the second is the regional timing, as it may be preferable to contain the response or postpone it if the US-Iranian negotiations are going through a sensitive phase. The third factor relates to the type of message required, as the response may come in multiple forms, whether through a limited security response, or technical using drones, or field at the border, or Even by installing undeclared field equations.
He concludes by emphasizing that all parties, so far, seem keen to prevent a big explosion, despite the continuation of what resembles a “Cold War with Fire,” considering that the current scene is closer to a “strategic finger-biting stage” and not a final decision to go to an all-out war, warning that the next stage is very sensitive, because any error in calculations may turn “controlled pressure” into a broader confrontation very quickly.
