– Political editor
Saudi diplomatic moves in Beirut are inseparable from the dynamic carried out by Lebanon’s “friends” from influential Western capitals, with the aim of first consolidating the ceasefire, secondly encouraging direct negotiations with Israel, and thirdly launching a constructive national dialogue to strengthen internal unity. Saudi goals are consistent with European, French, and American goals, in that the basic condition for achieving these three items is to confine arms to the Lebanese state.
Accordingly, the “effective” Saudi role in the Lebanese political arena is not limited to supporting the negotiation process or extending state authority over its entire territory, but rather goes beyond that to protecting the political “formula,” by emphasizing the importance of the unity of the Lebanese and ending any internal disputes, in parallel with ensuring Arab patronage while not compromising the Lebanese and Arab national constants, whether in the negotiation file in which Saudi Arabia is considered an influential party, or in the internal reality in light of the ongoing debate over the National Accord Document.
Former MP Dr. Mustafa Alloush considers that the issue of amending or reviewing the Taif Agreement is not on the table at the present time, stressing that the Saudi move, in addition to the Egyptian moves and the rest of the Arab initiatives supporting Lebanon, agree on a basic point, which is to start from the Taif Agreement and adhere to it at the present time.
Dr. Alloush believes that any discussion about developing or amending this agreement must take place in different circumstances, when the state is in control, and in a sound democratic environment that allows for constructive and fruitful dialogue. Alloush confirms that the essence of the Saudi diplomatic move today is focused on stopping the war and putting an end to the process of destruction, provided that the discussion of Lebanon’s shape in the next stage will come later. It reveals that all current trends are in the interest of the “reasonable people,” in contrast to the attempts of some parties to “outbid,” whether Christian or Shiite, despite their awareness that there are no real options to change the Taif Agreement.
Regarding the issue of negotiations with Israel, Alloush stresses the need to go into details, considering that Lebanon is heading into any negotiations with Israel in a weak position, and “naked” of the elements of power, as it must first determine whether it is able to demand that “Hezbollah” stop the war. But at the same time, he points out that the Israeli side is “luring Lebanon,” describing the Israeli Foreign Minister’s words as “malicious” when he denies the existence of problems between the two countries, while reality proves the opposite.
He points out that Lebanon faces a set of problems that must be solved before reaching a stage of broader understandings that go beyond simply stopping the war, and the primary goal of which is to end the use of Lebanon as an arena or tool in conflicts. He adds that the talk about eliminating the party is practically linked to eliminating the “Guardianship of the Jurist,” which is something beyond Lebanon’s ability, which makes the top priority be to stop the destruction and remove the country from the circle of regional use.
According to Alloush, national priorities come successively, starting with preserving the land, then returning the displaced, then reconstruction, while last on the list of priorities comes the issue of amending the constitution or abolishing the law criminalizing dealing with Israel.
In the context of talking about the feasibility of negotiations, Alloush raises a basic problem related to their purpose if Lebanon is unable to make a decision on war and peace, explaining that the minimum required is that the Lebanese state has prepared its files and papers well, and that it seeks to position the United States as “the Pride of the Age” alongside Lebanon, and convince it to play the role of a sponsor for Lebanon, not necessarily at the level of its support for Israel, but at least in a way that exceeds its support for Syria.
Alloush stresses that any American care must be translated into practice through protecting Lebanon’s stability and territorial integrity, and not just through slogans, especially those related to protecting Christians, considering that the success of the negotiations is supposed to be based on the American conviction that preserving the rights of the Lebanese is the basic approach to any sustainable settlement.
As for the possibility of repeating the Gaza experience and continuing the war, Alloush asserts that the comparison is inaccurate, given the different circumstances, as power in Gaza is in the hands of “Hamas,” while Lebanon officially declares that it does not want war. But he warns that if the party refuses to withdraw from the confrontation, Israel will continue fighting, on the basis that the continuation of its operations is linked to the party’s choices.
Alloush warns of an internal Israeli climate that is pushing towards escalation in Lebanon specifically, in contrast to the position on the Iranian file, and describes this as a major problem facing Lebanon that threatens the ceasefire.
Accordingly, the success of any truce remains linked to two basic factors: American pressure, and the party’s avoidance of any escalation, even limited, as Alloush believes that the party’s firing of a few missiles may prompt Israel to demand that the United States intervene to put an end to the party in exchange for stopping the war.
Alloush stresses the need to monitor what will happen in the Iranian file, stressing that the picture will soon become clear, whether in light of the war or even in its absence, given the state of erosion that the Iranian regime is suffering from, in addition to the impact of the increasing American blockade on it.
