– Amal Suhail
The ceasefire decision announced by Donald Trump after a call with Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, and approved by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the request of the US administration, remained the focus of observers’ attention to know the full story that led to this situation, amid conflicting information about the party that imposed this truce. There are still many outstanding questions: Is it a fragile truce after which we will return to war, or will we return to the 15 months that preceded the war of Israeli unilateral fire on Lebanon without any response?
Sources following the course of the negotiations and the agreement that took place comprehensively recount what happened, and say: “Iran had informed Hezbollah at noon on Wednesday, April 15, 2026, to move towards a temporary ceasefire lasting between a week and ten days, as part of a good faith initiative linked to Tehran’s return to the path of negotiations in Islamabad, which constituted one of the basic Iranian demands.” She explains that in this context, it is clear that the Lebanese file is not isolated, but rather is part of a broader regional scene and a major conflict that is redrawing the balance of power in the region.
The sources believe that the current move, which began in Islamabad and moved to other countries, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, in coordination with the United States, is not limited to temporary initiatives to stop the escalation, but rather constitutes an integrated political path aimed at managing the post-war phase and redrawing the region’s balances. Naturally, this path is reflected in Lebanon, as it is an organic part of this scene, which makes the temporary ceasefire there a direct translation of broader understandings in which international and regional powers have entered, most notably Tehran and Washington.
At the Lebanese level, sources indicate that the US administration is working on two parallel and complementary tracks: the first with Iran, by using the ceasefire as a political card to facilitate its return to the negotiating table in Islamabad, and the second with Lebanon, by involving the Lebanese government, albeit formally, in producing this track, which opens the door to pushing it to engage further in direct negotiations with Israel under American sponsorship.
The sources explain, at the regional level, that the involvement of Pakistan carries strategic implications related to introducing the regional Sunni dimension into the negotiation equation, given its deep intersections with both Türkiye and Saudi Arabia. Also, the proposed agenda is not limited to the Iranian nuclear file, but rather extends to include Israel’s security, and restructuring the use of Iranian oil resources, within a broader American vision that aims to limit Chinese influence, and reposition Iran within the regional system in a way that reduces its connection to the China-Russia axis.
The sources believe that what is happening is a comprehensive restructuring of the region, through which the balance of power is reproduced, which explains Hezbollah’s approach since the beginning of the confrontation, as it chose to position itself within the broader regional framework, allowing it to improve the conditions for indirect negotiation, and ensure the presence of the power elements associated with it in any potential political settlement.
On the other hand, sources indicate that the Lebanese state’s involvement in direct negotiations with Israel in Washington, in light of a clear internal division, raises structural problems related to the legality of this option and its political feasibility. The Lebanese Constitution and the laws in force restrict the issue of direct communication, which requires fundamental amendments if this path is established, in addition to the fact that it is taking place in the absence of a comprehensive national consensus.
The sources warn that rushing to engage in direct negotiations, without building a solid internal ground, may lead to reproducing previous historical experiences, as happened after the May 17 agreement during the era of President Amin Gemayel, when the unbalanced bet on the American path led to sharp internal divisions and long-term repercussions on political and institutional stability in the country.
In light of the above, the sources raise the need to use the temporary ceasefire period as an opportunity to rearrange the Lebanese interior, by crystallizing a unified national position and formulating a negotiating vision based on elements of realistic power, allowing Lebanon to enter any negotiating path from a more cohesive and influential position. It also warns against slipping into negotiations that may be used to impose strategic conditions, such as the issue of disarming Hezbollah or establishing buffer zones, as this may have serious repercussions on internal balances.
As for the continuation of Israeli violations in the hours following the ceasefire and until now, without any response from the party, the sources confirm that waiting does not mean acquiescing to what happened during the past 15 months, but rather aims to establish the argument against the aggressor. Thus, any future response will be legitimate under the eyes of the American shepherd, who apparently understood the message and instructed Israel not to launch attacks on Lebanon, while the coming hours will show whether Trump’s words are heard in Israel.
From this standpoint, the sources express cautious optimism, and consider that the current ceasefire, despite its fragility, may form part of a broader negotiating path whose features are still being shaped, stressing that internal unity constitutes an element of fortification and gain for Lebanon in light of the changes knocking on the door of the region and the world.
