– Muhammad Al-Madani
In Bkerke, the President of the Republic, General Joseph Aoun, made a statement indicating a clear attempt to change his position after a long period of delicate balances. The previous stage was characterized by adopting the option of “avoiding conflict,” which led to the opening of a dialogue with Hezbollah in the hope of reaching a gradual solution to the issue of weapons and the security decision. But this path, despite its length, did not achieve any tangible results, but rather led to political exhaustion that led internally to the consolidation of the status quo, and externally to raise questions about the state’s ability to make decisive decisions.
Essentially, the bet was that dialogue could be a solution that would preserve stability and lay the foundation for a gradual path toward the state regaining its control. However, the result was the opposite: the dialogue turned into a factor prolonging the crisis instead of resolving it, and the international confidence that had accumulated around the personality of Joseph Aoun since his leadership of the army began to shake. The outside world was not waiting for a miracle, but was waiting for practical indicators, not open management of time.
The decisive point was the transition from political dialogue to executive decision, when the military institution was asked to prepare a plan to deal with the illegal weapons file. Here the file entered a completely different stage, because it was no longer just a theoretical issue, but rather touched on the essence of the balance of power in Lebanon. This transformation placed the President of the Republic before a difficult equation: either continuing the policy of calm, or shifting to a clearer and more decisive speech.
The President’s last word clearly reflects his choice of the second direction. For the first time, a discourse appears that transcends gray language, approaching the establishment of clear political lines: no decision outside the state, no war outside institutions, and no continuation of duality of reference. More importantly, the message was not only internal, but carried regional dimensions related to Iran’s role and influence in the Lebanese equation.
But the basic question remains: Is this rhetorical shift enough to convince the outside world?
The answer is no…but it is a necessary condition, not a sufficient one. The international community, which gave President Aoun a large margin of confidence, is no longer satisfied with positions, but is waiting for a practical translation. That is, the problem is no longer “what is said,” but rather “what can be done.” Lebanon, from the outside perspective, has entered a stage of cumulative loss of credibility, where intentions are no longer sufficient to rebuild confidence.
However, the importance of what happened cannot be understated. Restoring the initiative politically and medially means that the Presidency is trying to move from a position of reaction to a position of action. This in itself is an important shift, because it reestablishes clear standards for internal debate and sets a formal ceiling upon which to build.
The equation today is that the President of the Republic is trying to tell the outside world, “I am ready,” but at the same time he realizes that any practical step requires a very sensitive internal balance. Here lies the problem: the gap between the ability to declare a position and the ability to implement it.
In conclusion, what President Aoun said is the beginning of a path, not the end of it. It is an attempt to rebuild trust, but the final judge will not be on the rhetoric, but on the next steps. Because the outside world is simply no longer asking what the president wants, but rather what he can do.
