Antoine Murad – Call of the Nation
The people of resistance are living in a state that ranges between shock and bewilderment about what their axis is being exposed to or what remains of it in terms of brutal war, and about the bitterest options that may be available to them, because what they had anticipated over several decades as tools of control and control is witnessing an accelerating collapse, and the military and financial capabilities and ideological load they have accumulated have reached the point of sanctification on one side and legal prohibition on the other side, collapsing and creating an unprecedented state that combines blind anger and extreme bitterness, and is represented by Sometimes with disbelief and betting on going too far in arrogance and rejecting reality.
This situation pushes Hezbollah, especially the leadership of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and its spiritual and political sponsors, which today controls the party and its field decisions, to search for ways out and for alternatives through which it maintains influence here and a presence there, relying on the factor of time and the “strategic break” as long as the Iranian regime exists and Hezbollah continues, even if at a minimum, according to what it bets on and believes in.
In the opinion of prominent sovereign circles, it is very difficult for the “party” to accept the decline of its influence at various levels, and that the Iranian regime, whose symbols are being subjected to assassination, torture, and attempts to dismantle it, will not easily accept what is planned for Lebanon and “Hezbollah.” Indeed, according to identical indications, it may resort to resorting to violent methods at home that it previously resorted to in cooperation with the defunct Syrian regime through its subsequent tutelage through the “party,” in order to reimpose its influence. Today it is declining and everyone understands that “no one has a tent over his head.”
These circles do not rule out repeating the 2005 scenario, when at an international moment that wanted to liberate Lebanon from the dominance of the Assad regime, Rafik Hariri was assassinated. Despite the withdrawal of the Syrian army and the surge of the “March 14” movement, a series of mobile bombings targeted Christian and Sunni areas, and a series of assassinations took place, including representatives, journalists, politicians, and security personnel.
According to data, Iran, which was the pioneer in adopting suicide operations at the height of the surge under the title of exporting the Islamic Revolution, after fearing the strong return of American and Western influence following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the deployment of multinational forces, most notably the American forces, took the decision to launch the first suicide operations that targeted the headquarters of the Israeli military governor of the city of Tire with a car bomb on November 12, 1982, which led to the death of seventy-five Israeli soldiers and about Twenty Lebanese and Palestinian prisoners, knowing that Israel considered the explosion at the time to have been caused by gas cylinders. Later, the American embassy in Ain al-Mreisseh was bombed by a car bomb driven by a suicide bomber on April 18, 1983, resulting in 63 deaths. This was followed by a similar operation that targeted the Marine headquarters near Beirut Airport on October 23, 1983, with a truck bomb driven by A suicide bomber killed 241 American officers and soldiers, coinciding with a similar attack on the headquarters of the French paratroopers known as Drakkar, which led to the death of fifty-eight of them. These operations were claimed at the time by the “Islamic Jihad” group, which is practically a group linked to Iran and which, in the opinion of many, constituted a faction representing the vanguards of “Hezbollah.”
This Iranian model was an example that was later emulated by many, whether from Palestinian factions or Sunni fundamentalist organizations, noting that the first Palestinian suicide operations took place more than ten years later, specifically on April 6, 1994, as the first “martyrdom” operation carried out by a member of the Hamas movement with an explosive belt who targeted a bus in the town of Afula, south of Nazareth, killing eight Israelis and wounding forty-four.
The same circles say that the Iranian regime today, with its regional extensions, feels an imminent existential danger that may entail “returning to the beginnings to avoid the scenario of endings,” by adopting previously adopted security operations such as assassinations, bombings, and suicide operations, especially since some recent threatening positions locally suggest this trend.
The circles, based on warnings and advice of a diplomatic nature, do not rule out the possibility of resorting to attempts to sow discord, knowing that the Lebanese army and security services are preparing well for this possibility, and there is coordination at more than one level to provide political cover for the official security position, knowing that resorting to the option of destabilizing security is a dangerous option and will put the various Lebanese who reject it in a position of seriously standing behind the Lebanese army and the Lebanese state in their confrontation with it.
It remains that the Lebanese state, as a government, needs a more solid and coherent political position that compensates for the weakness of its field position, in order to regain its credibility and confidence in it internally and externally, after the recent setbacks and the inability to implement the sovereign decisions taken in succession with the good intentions behind them. Therefore, the search for a negotiating path to contain the current reality and jump to a new stage that promises stability and salvation from cycles of violence and wars, without artificial obstacles that must also be faced. Firmly. Negotiating with the outside world is essentially the prerogative of the President of the Republic, and therefore he has the right to choose, in coordination with the government, who will represent him, regardless of the traditional and narrow political and sectarian balances, similar to the attempt of the “duo” to impose a representative in the supposed negotiating delegation. Note that a delegation can be formed from outside factional calculations, and the selection of its members is based on the national and moral commitment, competence, and experience required. This means that the delegation may include an Islamic or Christian majority, and it may even include two Shiite members, not just one member, provided that That the President of the Republic be the one who chooses them, without returning to the “duo,” which also applies to the various political parties.
