In light of the speed witnessed by the procedures for launching the tender for managing the cellular sector, questions are increasing about how to prepare for this tender and who will be responsible for implementing it. This file is supposed to represent a real beginning for reforming one of the state’s most important resources. While the official authorities are talking about an update and a rescue plan, informed sources reveal information that raises serious doubts about the party to whom the obligation will be made, the cost of consultations, the role of supervisory bodies, in addition to the timing of the next steps in light of the upcoming political entitlements.
Informed sources revealed to us an intention to contract with Arab companies to manage the sector, as part of what they described as an “almost settled agreement” that is being prepared away from the limelight, which raises fears that the awaited tender is merely a formality to legitimize an option that was made previously.
According to the sources, there are names of companies on the table, including “Etisalat” and “Zain,” which is headed by businessman Badr Al-Kharafi, who has a strong relationship with Communications Minister Charles Al-Hajj. Here a fundamental problem arises related to the potential conflict of interests, and the extent of the ability to ensure the transparency of the path in light of this overlap between political, administrative and commercial interests. The sources add that “the recipe is almost ready,” which raises questions about the feasibility of the tender if its results are determined in advance.
It is worth noting that there was a lawsuit filed before the Lebanese judiciary in 2020 against representatives of the “Zain” company, due to suspicions of corruption in the process of purchasing the “Touch” building, which led to the payment of $100 million for a building valued at $22 million. A decision was issued by the urgent matters judge at the time preventing the acquittal of “Zain” and the members of its board of directors due to the lawsuit, and it has not been decided yet, despite its exit from the market, due to… Formal defenses presented by the two ministers concerned with this file, Jamal Al-Jarrah and Muhammad Shuqair, and they consider that the House of Representatives is the competent authority to try them.
It must also be recalled that the State Audit Bureau, in its famous decision to fine the communications ministers, sent a request to the Minister of Communications to do what was necessary to collect compensation for the damage amounting to (2,750,000) US dollars, as a result of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Touch when it was managing Zain, and its appointee, Peter Kalliopolis, withdrew from the decision to terminate the lease contract in contravention of the instructions given to him, and despite Minister Boutros Harb’s request to him to reconfirm the termination decision.
In a related context, the sources stop at what they consider a “glaring paradox,” which is the move to conduct a special tender to contract with a consulting body, which is responsible for preparing the book of conditions and supervising the basic tender that will lead to the selection of the operating company. According to circulating information, the cost of this consultation may reach about one million dollars, while the treasury suffers from a chronic deficit, and the priority is supposed to be rationalizing spending, not increasing it.
The sources raise direct questions about the role of the Minister of Communications in this option, and why an external party is resorted to at a high cost to prepare a book of conditions, while the Public Procurement Authority will be informed of the consulting tender before launching the main tender, which practically means the existence of a “tender that precedes the tender,” and devotes a complex and expensive path instead of adopting simpler and more transparent mechanisms.
In parallel, a fundamental question arises related to the philosophy of the adopted approach: Is the mission of the “reform government” limited to bringing in external operators to manage the sector, or is its role supposed to begin by reforming it from within and putting it on the path to good governance? The reform logic requires preparing a clear paper to restructure cellular companies, improve their performance and productivity, and increase their revenues, in preparation for preparing them for a stage in which the private sector can be involved in a thoughtful manner.
Only then does it become realistic to talk about introducing a strategic partner that will buy a share of these companies within a clear, final path, instead of continuing with temporary solutions based on state ownership while another party takes over operation. A state that declares its commitment to reform is supposed to work first to raise the efficiency of its assets and maximize their value, and then present the option of involving the private sector in a way that achieves a return for the treasury, rather than remaining in the position of paying the operating allowance while it is already suffering from a stifling financial crisis.
The sources indicate that charging the state an additional million dollars under the title of “consultation” raises questions about the management philosophy adopted in the ministry, especially since this sector is supposed to be a source of income and not a new gateway to waste. Is it necessary to actually develop the sector, or to reproduce an expensive management system that lacks accountability?
In parallel, the sources link what is said about the “ninety-day plan” to develop the sector, and the expected electoral entitlement after the expiration of this period, which opens the door to fears of exploiting the stage to make appointments, promotions, or rent new sites and install transmission stations in specific areas, which may be used in a service or electoral context.
The sources warn that this interim plan will turn into a space for political repositioning within the sector, instead of being a structural reform step that addresses the deficiencies that have accumulated for years, starting from governance to transparency in contracts.
In a related context, it emerged A parliamentary question directed to the government Regarding the implementation of Cabinet Resolution No. 5 dated 01/15/2026 relating to the obligation to manage and operate the MIC1 and MIC2 cellular networks, which included a package of regulatory clarifications related to the legal basis of the approved path, the criteria for choosing the “management and operation” model, and the role of the telecommunications sector regulatory body, in addition to the mechanisms for preparing the book of conditions and supervising the tender.
The representatives requested that the House of Representatives be provided with a full copy of the report of the ministerial committee that studied the options, and to clarify whether written comparisons had been made between the alternatives presented, and why a specific option was adopted and not another. The question also focused on the issue of charging the operator with operational and capital expenses, how to finance and record them in accounting, and ensuring that the sector is not burdened with unjustified burdens or creates confusion in the ownership of assets that are considered public funds.
The question also raised problems related to the concept of a “percentage discount” in favor of the treasury, the limits of applying the Public Procurement Law, control mechanisms and preventing cost inflation or resorting to subsequent change orders, in addition to demanding the disclosure of correspondence related to the market survey and the opinion of the Legislation and Consultation Authority, and determining the executive timetable for the proposed path.
This parliamentary move reflects an increasing climate of caution towards the expected obligatory path, in light of demands for prior clarifications and transparent guarantees before proceeding with any executive step affecting one of the state’s most prominent resources.
The sources conclude by emphasizing that the Minister of Communications is directly concerned with clarifying these points to public opinion, especially with regard to the cost of consultation, the mechanism for selecting it, guarantees to prevent conflicts of interest, and the relationship of any potential company with political officials. A file of this size cannot tolerate ambiguity, and the communications sector is not an administrative detail, but rather an essential financial pillar of the state.
In conclusion, the question remains: Are we facing a true reform bid, or are we facing a redistribution of roles under a new name? The coming days will reveal the answer, but only transparency can remove doubts.
