The Israeli army is amending its military doctrine: moving from preventing surprise to preventing collapse and preparing for the return of Hamas
Three years after the October 7 attack, the Israeli army dropped the premise of preventing surprise from its strategic calculations, and began focusing its preparations on ensuring that any new military surprise does not turn into a widespread collapse in the military system, in parallel with preparing for the scenario of Hamas’ rapid return to the areas from which the army withdraws within the Gaza Strip.
In a report prepared by journalist Shai Levy and published by the Israeli “Mako” website, the army’s practical assessment shows that it does not count on continued calm in the Gaza Strip, but rather stems from an inevitable conviction that the next surprise is coming, and the questions currently focus only on the timing of its occurrence.
A military source explained to the website that Hamas’s current desire to avoid a resumption of fighting aims to invest calm in concentration, rehabilitating infrastructure, building capabilities, and expanding control over the population. He added that the military establishment takes into account the possibility that Hamas or other factions may change their methods in order to surprise Israel again.
This transformation is considered the most prominent lesson learned from the events of October 7, as the military leadership acknowledges the impossibility of ensuring the prevention of any surprise, but it confirms the possibility of preventing a recurrence of the collapse of the system. In practice, the new military system requires that it continue to operate efficiently even in the worst scenarios. So that the reserve forces, command and control, and town defense mechanisms are organized to prevent the hours of emptiness, confusion, and helplessness witnessed that day.
This approach is consistent with what Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir presented this week, when he confirmed that the army’s strategy is based on readiness for a sudden war without warning.
At the field level, another scenario emerges related to the aftermath of the withdrawal from the current areas of control in the Gaza Strip. According to the military source, Hamas fully controls about 40% of the area of Gaza and about two million Palestinians residing behind the “yellow line,” maintaining mechanisms of control and influence despite Israeli attempts to build local power centers to compete with it.
The report indicated that the joint operations of the anti-Hamas militias and the Israeli air strikes achieve tactical achievements that reduce the risks of the forces, but they do not change the general strategic picture that confirms that Hamas remains the dominant force in those areas.
In this context, the army’s new doctrine assumes that Hamas will rush to return to any area from which the army withdraws under any future agreement, to reimpose its control, build governance mechanisms, and restore its military capabilities. Therefore, the fundamental question for the military establishment is not whether or not it is possible to return, but rather the speed with which Hamas will be able to do so.
This challenge reflects the essence of the internal security debate in Israel. On the one hand, there is a growing desire to avoid a permanent stay inside the Gaza Strip, and on the other hand, the army realizes that any vacuum that will be created following the withdrawal will quickly be filled by Hamas.
To confront this, the army has developed approved operational plans that are not limited to confronting surprise attacks, but also include dealing with Hamas’ exploitation of Israeli withdrawals, while ensuring the ability to quickly return and direct strikes, and ensuring that the system will not collapse even if a surprise occurs. Thus, the Israeli military establishment has moved its strategy from the impossible effort to prevent surprise to the preparation to absorb and contain it, in light of the firm conviction that any vacuum left by the forces in Gaza will quickly turn into an environment in which Hamas will regain its influence and capabilities.
